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Corporate Crime and Punishment: An
Empirical Study
Dorothy S. Lund & Natasha Sarin
For many years, law and economics scholars, as well as politicians and
regulators, have debated whether corporate punishment chills beneficial
corporate activity or, in the alternative, lets corporate criminals off too easily. A
crucial and yet understudied aspect of this debate is empirical evidence. Unlike
most other types of crime, the government does not measure corporate crime
rates; therefore, the government and researchers alike cannot easily determine
whether disputed policies are effectively deterring future incidents of corporate
misconduct. In this Article, we take important first steps in addressing these
questions. Specifically, we use three novel sources as proxies for corporate
crime: the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) Suspicious Activity
Reports (SARs), consumer complaints made to the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (CFPB), and whistleblower complaints made to the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC). Each source reveals an increase in
complaints or reports indicative of corporate misconduct over the past decade.
We also examine levels of public company recidivism and find that they are
likewise on the rise. And we document a potential explanation: recidivist
companies are much larger than nonrecidivist companies, but they receive
smaller fines than non-recidivist companies (measured as a percentage of market
capitalization and revenue). We conclude by offering recommendations for
enforcement agencies and policymakers. In particular, our results suggest that
enforcers are unlikely to achieve optimal deterrence using fines alone.
Enforcement agencies should therefore consider other ways of securing
deterrence, such as by seeking penalties against guilty individuals and the top
executives who facilitate their crimes.

Introduction
Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic stimulus negotiations, corporate
liability was a sticking point. Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell and
other Senate Republicans demanded that any additional support to struggling
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households be paired with federal liability shields that would restrict
pandemic lawsuits from targeting corporations and their employees.1
Democrats contended that liability shields would precipitate negligence by
businesses, universities, and hospitals that knew they would never be held
accountable for misbehavior.2
Although the pandemic brought these issues to the surface, they are not
new, and indeed, the standards by which we hold businesses accountable for
malfeasance is a significant area of public concern. Complex trade-offs
govern the existing legal framework: on the one hand, forceful punishment
for firms may chill beneficial economic activity; on the other, the failure to
hold businesses and their employees accountable for misconduct can
encourage future bad behavior. These arguments were at the forefront of the
conversation during the financial crisis of 2008, when the Department of
Justice’s (DOJ) lax approach to pursuing individual bankers precipitated
public outrage.3 And they will surface again.
A crucial and yet understudied component of this debate is
understanding how corporate misconduct fluctuates in response to changes
in enforcement and punishment. Perversely, however, the government makes

1. Interview by Neil Cavuto, Anchor, Fox News, with Mitch McConnell, Sen., U.S. Senate
(Apr.
28,
2020),
https://video.foxnews.com/v/6152708313001#sp=show-clips
[https://
perma.cc/J269-KG27]; see also Sarah Jones, Why Is Mitch McConnell So Obsessed With
Liability Shields?, N.Y. MAG.: INTELLIGENCER (Dec. 11, 2020), https://nymag.com/
intelligencer/2020/12/what-is-mitch-mcconnells-covid-19-liability-shield.html [https://perma.cc/
RS4M-96QE] (explaining Senator McConnell’s support for liability shields); Diana Ransom, The
GOP Wants to Pass Greater Liability Protections. Do Businesses Need Them?, INC. (Aug. 18,
2020),
https://www.inc.com/diana-ransom/liability-protection-heals-act-phase-4-stimulus.html
[https://perma.cc/6F4H-AY4S] (describing the liability shields proposed by Republicans).
2. See Patrick Gleason, Democrats Say Covid-19 Legal Liability Protection Is a Dealbreaker in
Congress, But Not in the States, FORBES (Dec. 11, 2020, 12:42 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites
/patrickgleason/2020/12/11/democrats-say-covid-19-legal-liability-protection-is-a-dealbreaker-incongress-but-not-in-the-states/?sh=2eb759565fd4 [https://perma.cc/W8TV-8WFV] (“Speaker
[Nancy] Pelosi, Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer, and fellow Democrats have insisted such
liability protection is a deal breaker for them in the past . . . .”).
3. See, e.g., Wall Street Reform: Oversight of Financial Stability and Consumer and Investor
Protections: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urb. Affs., 113 Cong. 29–30
(2013) (remarks of Sen. Elizabeth Warren, Member, S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urb. Affairs)
(asking why large financial institutions are not taken to trial) (video available at https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=mavB1lbtIow [https://perma.cc/54AX-7WEX]); Jed S. Rakoff, The
Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS,
Jan. 9, 2014, at 4, 4 [hereinafter Rakoff, Why Have No High-Level Executives Been Prosecuted?]
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/01/09/financial-crisis-why-no-executive-prosecutions/
[https://perma.cc/WUY5-CFQX] (pointing out that financial institution executives were not
prosecuted in the aftermath the Great Recession); Brandon L. Garrett, The Rise of Bank
Prosecutions, 126 YALE L.J. F. 33 (2016) [hereinafter Garrett, Bank Prosecutions] (describing how
federal judges asked why so few prosecutions were brought against large financial institutions);
David Zaring, Litigating the Financial Crisis, 100 VA. L. REV. 1405 (2014) (noting that private
sector actors were not sanctioned in courts in the aftermath of the financial crisis).
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no attempt to measure corporate crime.4 Compare this dearth of data to what
exists for public-order crime: each year, two government agencies provide
detailed crime statistics for each category.5 This data allows researchers to
evaluate changes in litigation and other enforcement practices and consider
whether they are optimally deterring criminal conduct. When it comes to
corporate crime, however, the same body of research does not exist.
The importance of this asymmetry should not be understated. Most
basically, the lack of statistical data surely hampers corporate criminal
enforcement efforts. Suppose that the police in your city took no steps to
measure the number of robberies each year. As such, if there was a steady
increase, the police (and the government agencies with authority over the
police) would not know about it, nor would they be able to develop an
adequate response. In reality, government bodies take great pains to measure
the level of violent crime in their jurisdiction because it helps them calibrate
whether or not additional steps need to be taken to increase deterrence.6 But
for corporate crime—which can affect millions of people’s lives and bring
down entire economies—enforcement plows forward blindly, subject to
political winds rather than taking a clear look at whether crime is being
adequately deterred.
Even more importantly, the lack of corporate crime statistics contributes
to inequity in our criminal justice system. It is evident that the U.S. operates
a two-tier criminal justice system that disproportionately affects people of
color.7 In particular, blue-collar offenders generally serve jail sentences for
4. Likewise, the government has only sporadically offered limited estimates of white-collar
crime. See DONALD A. MANSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., NCJ 102867,
TRACKING OFFENDERS: WHITE COLLAR CRIME (1986), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/towcc.pdf [https://perma.cc/WR29-SJVH] (showing the last estimate of white-collar crime by the
BJS); see also CINDY R. ALEXANDER & MARK A. COHEN, GEORGE MASON UNIV. SCH. OF LAW:
LAW & ECON. CTR., TRENDS IN THE USE OF NON-PROSECUTION, DEFERRED PROSECUTION, AND
PLEA AGREEMENTS IN THE SETTLEMENT OF ALLEGED CORPORATE CRIMINAL WRONGDOING 28
(2015), https://masonlec.org/site/rte_uploads/files/Full%20Report%20-%20SCJI%20NPA-DPA%
2C%20April%202015%281%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/AJM5-ELL2] (“In comparison with street
crime, where victimization rates can be tracked over time through victim surveys and by crimes
reported to police, there is relatively little documentation of the harm from corporate crime or its
victims or frequency of occurrence.”).
5. See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
6. One exception is data about gun violence, which, as a result of industry lobbying, has been
quite limited since 1996. Samantha Raphelson, How the NRA Worked to Stifle Gun Violence
Research, NPR (Apr. 5, 2018, 3:01 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/04/05/599773911/how-the-nraworked-to-stifle-gun-violence-research [https://perma.cc/6LT4-T4SX].
7. See Paul Butler, Race and Adjudication, in 3 REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRETRIAL AND
TRIAL PROCESSES 211 (Erik Luna ed., 2017) (discussing how people of color are disproportionately
affected by every step of adjudication in the criminal justice system); DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL
JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 8–9 (1999) (same); THE
SENT’G PROJECT, REPORT OF THE SENTENCING PROJECT TO THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL
RAPPORTEUR ON CONTEMPORARY FORMS OF RACISM, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, XENOPHOBIA,
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public-order crimes; white-collar criminals are rarely prosecuted, and when
they are, they generally bear less severe consequences.8 Much has been
written about the reasons for this inequity, and we offer an additional
explanation: crime statistics play an important role in fueling policing efforts.
If the public notices an upward trend in crime, it clamors for additional
enforcement—increased monitoring of vulnerable areas, a quicker response
time when calls are received, stronger charges in cases against arrestees—
and police and prosecutors generally respond. There is no such information
to guide public opinion when it comes to corporate crime. Not only that, the
lack of statistics for corporate crime insulates enforcement agencies that take
a lenient approach to corporate punishment. Without any information about
whether crime is increasing, agencies can hide behind statements that their
enforcement policies are adequately, or even optimally, deterring crime.
Indeed, as the 2008 financial crisis shows, enforcement agencies rarely face
a reckoning unless their lax policies contribute to an environment that nearly
brings down the global economy.
This Article takes important steps toward addressing this asymmetry. It
first offers an empirical analysis of the shift in the legal landscape over the
past decade that not only decreased the likelihood that corporations would be
prosecuted and that individuals would be held criminally liable, but also
increased the size of monetary fines imposed on corporations. It then
identifies three novel data sources that shed light on the question of whether
crime has risen at U.S. public companies in the wake of these changes.
Specifically, it identifies three proxies for corporate misconduct in order to
study trends over time. Proxy data are particularly useful in this context—
unlike most violent crime, corporate crime can be harder to observe and is
often defined by broad and amorphous criminal statutes, complicating its
measurement.
AND RELATED INTOLERANCE: REGARDING RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE UNITED STATES CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 1 (2018), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/un-report-on-racial-

disparities/ [https://perma.cc/9AAS-P9AJ] (same). In its discussion of two distinct criminal justice
systems in the United States, The Sentencing Project states:
The wealthy can access a vigorous adversary system replete with
constitutional protections for defendants. Yet the experiences of poor and
minority defendants within the criminal justice system often differ
substantially from that model due to a number of factors, each of which
contributes to the overrepresentation of such individuals in the system.
Id.
8. See generally COLE, supra note 7 (discussing the disparity between prosecution rates between
types of criminals); JEFFREY H. REIMAN, THE RICH GET RICHER AND THE POOR GET PRISON
(1979) (arguing that “crimes unique to the wealthy are either ignored or treated lightly, while for
the so-called common crimes, the poor are far more likely than the well-off to be arrested, if arrested
charged, if charged convicted, and if convicted sentenced to prison”); John L. Hagan & Ilene H.
Nagel, White-Collar Crime, White-Collar Time: The Sentencing of White-Collar Offenders in the
Southern District of New York, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 259 (1982) (demonstrating “a strong
correlation between lenient sentencing practices and white-collar offenses”).
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To proxy for corporate crime, we utilize three distinct data sources: the
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) Suspicious Activity
Reports (SARs), consumer complaints made to the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (CFPB), and whistleblower complaints made to the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).9 These data come from a
variety of vantage points: SAR reports are required to be filed by financial
institutions under certain circumstances that are highly suggestive of
malfeasance, while the CFPB data are generated by aggravated consumers of
financial products.10 Whistleblower complaints are generally filed by
employees of banks and companies who suspect that financial crime has
occurred; if the information leads to a successful enforcement action, the
whistleblower is eligible for a large bounty.11 By examining both reports by
employees who report observed crimes and consumers who are harmed by
misconduct committed by institutions with which they do business, we can
usefully extrapolate information about overall crime trends.
Our results are summarized as follows: In the period from 2012 to 2019,
we document a steep upward trend in SARs filed across every single agency
that collects them (the OCC, the FDIC, the FHIFA, the NCUA, the FRB, the
IRS, and the SEC). We focus only on those cases where SARs report insider
involvement in financial crimes; thus, our data indicate that financial
institutions flagged their own involvement in a greater number of transactions
suggestive of money laundering, fraud, or other financial crimes in each year

9. We are not the first to try to extrapolate levels of financial misconduct from sources other
than enforcement data. Indeed, an extensive literature attempts to measure the specific types of
financial misconduct using one of three databases: accounting restatements, securities class action
lawsuits, and accounting and auditing enforcement releases. E.g., Jonathan M. Karpoff, Allison
Koester, D. Scott Lee & Gerald S. Martin, Proxies and Databases in Financial Misconduct
Research, ACCT. REV., Nov. 2017, at 129, 142. We decided to study different datasets for several
reasons. For one, we in many ways prefer our datasets because they allow us to study the time trend
of post-crisis financial institution misconduct across several dimensions beyond securities and
accounting fraud. In addition, the accounting restatement data are also known to be incomplete and
misleading. See id. (explaining the misleading aspects of these databases). Of course, any data
exercise on these questions is imperfect—including the analysis contained in our Article, which is
why our claims are ultimately quite limited. For example, we do not claim to measure actual crime
levels, but instead document trends that suggest a rise in financial institution crime over time. Cf.
Alexander Dyck, Adair Morse & Luigi Zingales, How Pervasive Is Corporate Fraud? (Rotman
Sch. of Mgmt., Working Paper No. 2222608, 2013), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2222608 [https://
perma.cc/PW2T-243Q] (providing an estimate of the undetected share of corporate fraud).
10. Consumer Complaint Database, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, https://www
.consumerfinance.gov/data-research/consumer-complaints/
[https://perma.cc/43AW-TD6V];
Suspicious Activity Report Statistics Database, FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, https://
www.fincen.gov/reports/sar-stats [https://perma.cc/N2SP-FRUU].
11. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2019 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: WHISTLEBLOWER
PROGRAM 4 (2019) [hereinafter WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM], https://www.sec.gov/files/sec-2019annual-report-whistleblower-program.pdf [https://perma.cc/T46T-6XR4] (“Awards must be made
in an amount that is 10 percent or more and 30 percent or less of the monetary sanctions collected.”).
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for the past five years.12 In addition, we document an upward trend in
consumer complaints submitted to the CFPB from November 2014 to August
2019, in all but a single category. Finally, we also observe a steady increase
in whistleblower tips submitted to the SEC from 2011 to 2018. In sum, our
data suggest an upward trend in reports of financial misconduct from three
distinct sources that cover a broad range of crimes.
We recognize, however, that the implications that can be drawn from
this data are necessarily limited due to imperfections in these datasets. For
one, our data proxy for corporate misconduct, which may not correlate
perfectly with corporate crime. We infer, however, that broader evidence of
misconduct generally infers broader criminal activity and allows us to
estimate trends in corporate criminality over time. However, factors that
impact the incidence of misconduct reporting can confound our results. For
example, it is possible that following the financial crisis, financial institutions
were more careful to report suspicious activity, and therefore SAR filings
increased for that reason. Likewise, perhaps whistleblower tips trended
upward not because of an increase in criminality, but because of growing
recognition of the large bounties available. Finally, perhaps consumers of
financial products were simply becoming familiar with a new tool provided
by a new agency, and that fact explains the increase in complaints made to
the CFPB. Regarding the latter concern, however, we document a decrease
in consumer complaints related to mortgages after July 2016; all other
complaint types increase. This fall in mortgage complaints is consistent with
increased scrutiny from the federal government about mortgage practices in
the years following the financial crisis, as new regulations and regulatory
oversight helped eliminate abusive practices.13 Although this is not the only
plausible explanation—it could be attributable to a fall in mortgage
delinquencies, for example14—it suggests that the increase in other types of
complaints is not solely attributable to an increase in consumer familiarity
with the consumer complaint resource. If that were the sole cause, we would
expect to see an increase in complaints across all dimensions.

12. SAR data comprises both business-related and individual suspicious activity. To proxy for
corporate crime, we isolate SARs referencing institutional insiders (employees, directors, agents,
officers, and controlling shareholders). See discussion infra subpart II(A).
13. See ANDREAS FUSTER, MATTHEW PLOSSER & JAMES VICKERY, FED. RSRV. BANK OF N.Y.,
STAFF REPORT NO. 857, DOES CFPB OVERSIGHT CRIMP CREDIT? (2018), https://
www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr857.pdf
[https://perma.cc
/EP9X-7N37] (finding that the CFPB’s regulatory oversight affects mortgage credit supply and
reduces risky bank behavior).
14. See Mortgages 90 Days or More Delinquent, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, https://
www.consumerfinance.gov/data-research/mortgage-performance-trends/mortgages-90-or-moredays-delinquent/ [https://perma.cc/8QHG-L54N] (documenting mortgage delinquency trends over
time).
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In general, the volatility in our data series suggests that we are picking
up on something more than changes in reporting practices. Taken together,
our data show that corporate crime levels rise postcrisis, but in a nonmonotonic way. It is certainly possible that this volatility is a by-product of
changes in enforcement priorities, but it is likely that at least a portion of the
uptick we document reflects an increase in the underlying level of criminal
behavior. And given the features of the federal enforcement regime that we
observe—the near disappearance of individual liability, especially for top
executives, and the low number of corporate prosecutions—our results are
unlikely to strike many as surprising.
As further support for our interpretation of the data, we study public
company recidivism, relying on data provided by Brandon Garrett.15 We
define a corporate recidivist to be a public company that was prosecuted more
than once between 2001 and 2018. We normalize fines by three measures of
firm size—assets, revenue, and headcount. And we document a steep rise in
recidivism during this time period, across public companies in all
industries.16
We also observe some interesting characteristics of recidivist firms and
their penalties. We find that larger firms tend to be recidivists; firms that
offend only once are much smaller (as measured by market capitalization and
number of employees) than recidivist firms. In addition, although recidivist
firms bear fines that are, on average, twice the size of those borne by nonrecidivist firms, these penalties are miniscule when scaled by the company’s
assets or employees. For large firms, therefore, it may be more appropriate to
think of these fines as inconsequential “parking tickets”17 rather than

15. Brandon L. Garrett & Jon Ashley, Legal Data Lab at the Univ. of Va. Arthur J. Morris L.
Libr. & Duke Univ. Sch. of L., Corporate Prosecution Registry (Aug. 16, 2019) [hereinafter Garrett,
Corporate Prosecution Registry], http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/corporate-prosecution-registry
/index.html [https://perma.cc/B9EG-VJU4].
16. This is not driven by the fact that the time horizon grows as years pass, e.g., a firm
committing a crime in 2002 has only one year of prior criminal history, versus a firm in 2018 has
17 years. In fact, in the immediate aftermath of the crisis, the share of crimes committed by a
recidivist jumps from 7% in 2010 (averaging around 10% in the decade prior) to 28% in 2011
(averaging over 30% in the decade that follows). See infra fig.14.
17. Oversight of the Federal Trade Commission: Strengthening Protections for Americans’
Privacy and Data Security: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Prot. & Com. of the H.
Comm. on Energy & Com., 116th Cong. 51 (2019) (statement of Rohit Chopra, Comm’r, Fed. Trade
Comm’n).
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meaningful deterrents.18 For smaller firms, fines represent a greater burden.19
This may explain why their deterrent value (as measured by the likelihood of
offending again) is higher than the relatively lower fines ascribed to their
larger counterparts. Perversely, therefore, concern about the potential adverse
effects of criminal prosecution on large firms and their shareholders and the
ramifications for the broader economy may insulate the malfeasance that is
most socially disruptive from adequate punishment.20
In sum, our data indicate that corporate misconduct is on the rise, and
we theorize that the current federal enforcement regime has a share of the
blame. Although high fines imposed irregularly could result in efficient and
adequate deterrence under certain circumstances,21 our results indicate that
fines are too low or imposed too sporadically to effectively deter crime.22 In
theory, a fine that is set equal to the social cost of the crime, adjusted upward
to account for the probability of underdetection, will cause management to
optimally prevent future instances of harm.23 But the optimal fine might not
be possible to calculate (what is the social cost of eighty-six lives?) or legally

18. See MARSHALL B. CLINARD & PETER C. YEAGER, CORPORATE CRIME 124–25 (1980)
(“The $437,500 fine imposed against General Electric in the electrical equipment conspiracy was
said to be the equivalent to a parking fine for many citizens.”). Of course, another explanation is
possible—perhaps larger companies are more likely to be pursued by the government. We observe,
however, that recidivists are not more likely to have a corporate monitor or audit requirement
imposed by the government in the first enforcement action. This indicates that our results are not
explained by the ease of prosecution, although it does not rule out the hypothesis that enforcement
agencies prefer to target larger companies for multiple rounds of enforcement actions.
19. Note that this is the opposite of the approach taken by countries in Scandinavia, which scale
up fines for certain crimes based on the offender’s income. Joe Pinsker, Finland, Home of the
$103,000 Speeding Ticket, ATLANTIC (Mar. 12, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/
archive/2015/03/finland-home-of-the-103000-speeding-ticket/387484/
[https://perma.cc/7JK5MY6Z].
20. See, e.g., Eric Holder, U.S. Att’y Gen., Remarks Before the Senate Judiciary Committee
(Mar. 6, 2013), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/transcript-attorney-general-eric-holder-ontoo-big-to-jail [https://perma.cc/Q949-YF9T] (acknowledging the difficulty in prosecuting large
institutions for fear that it will negatively impact national and world economies).
21. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193,
1206 (1985) (“If the costs of collecting fines are assumed to be zero regardless of the size of the
fine, the most efficient combination is a probability arbitrarily close to zero and a fine arbitrarily
close to infinity.”); Gerard E. Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law in Policing Corporate Misconduct,
60 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 23, 32, 36 (1997) (discussing fines as a means of deterring criminal
conduct).
22. See Rakoff, Why Have No High-Level Executives Been Prosecuted?, supra note 3, at 4, 6,
8 (arguing that the imposition of fines is not effective at deterring corporate crime).
23. Shavell and Polinsky provide the classic view, that “[i]f firms are made strictly liable for
their harms, they will design rewards and punishments for their employees that will lead employees
to reduce the risk of harm, since firms will want to reduce their liability payments.” A. Mitchell
Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Should Employees Be Subject to Fines and Imprisonment Given the
Existence of Corporate Liability?, 13 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 240 (1993).
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or politically feasible to levy (what if the optimal fine puts the firm into
bankruptcy or is well beyond the statutory cap?).24
Not only that, there are also practical limitations to the corporation’s
ability to adequately deter future incidents of crime when the only
punishment is an entity-level fine.25 Quite obviously, a fine primarily affects
shareholders, not necessarily the individuals who committed the crime and
who may have garnered private benefits from its commission. In theory,
shareholders should have an incentive to demand reforms that would deter
future criminal behavior that will depress the value of their shares, but
rationally apathetic shareholders might not recognize the problem or
understand how to address it.26 In addition, the ultimate deterrent effect of
fines against corporations and their shareholders may be muted: although a
company’s stock price generally falls when charges are filed, it usually
bounces back very quickly and tends to rise upon the fine’s announcement.27
Therefore, shareholders might not demand an appropriate reduction in
activity levels or the right amount of firm-wide monitoring to avoid future
instances of crime.28
Our Article therefore makes two primary contributions. First, we use
three novel data sources as a proxy for corporate crime. Importantly, we are
one of the only papers to look beyond enforcement data, which is subject to
24. See Lawrence Summers, Companies on Trial: Are They ‘Too Big to Jail’?, FIN. TIMES
(Nov. 21, 2014), https://www.ft.com/content/e3bf9954-7009-11e4-90af-00144feabdc0 [https://
perma.cc/7PW9-PFBG] (noting the collateral consequences that occur when corporations are
punished, including harm to innocent employees and shareholders, and observing that these
consequences have affected enforcement policy).
25. See Jennifer Arlen, Corporate Criminal Liability: Theory and Evidence, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CRIMINAL LAW 144, 170–71 (Alon Harel & Keith N. Hylton
eds., 2012) [hereinafter Arlen, Corporate Criminal Liability], http://www.ioea.eu/pdf/textes_2012
/LEC-Arlen_Chapter-7.pdf [https://perma.cc/7VLD-DN4N] (discussing why the government
cannot rely on corporate liability alone to optimally deter crime by employees of publicly held
firms).
26. According to Arlen, management might not respond to the penalty if they have only a small
equity stake in the company or if the firm cannot easily control employees. Id. We offer additional
reasons to believe that an entity-level fine may fail to serve as an adequate deterrent by itself—
affected shareholders are unlikely to take corrective action.
27. JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., CORPORATE CRIME AND PUNISHMENT: THE CRISIS OF
UNDERENFORCEMENT 65 (2020) (“In response to the fine’s announcement, the stock market price
of the defendant corporation has generally gone up (often significantly) and seldom down to any
significant degree.”); Jonathan M. Karpoff & John R. Lott, Jr., The Reputational Penalty Firms
Bear from Committing Criminal Fraud, 36 J.L. & ECON. 757, 759 (1993) (finding evidence that
initial allegations of corporate fraud correspond to an average decrease of 1.34% in stock price).
28. See Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis
of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 700 n.30 (1997) (“Shareholders of publicly
held firms may be less able to rely on managers to implement optimal preventive and policing
measures because managers bear much of the cost of prevention and policing but do not directly
bear the firm’s expected liability for any wrongdoing that occurs.”); Summers, supra note 24
(“Shareholders who have no direct role in corporate decision-making, and who often were not even
holding shares at the time of the crime, are an odd target for retribution.”).
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endogeneity concerns, when evaluating corporate criminal enforcement.29
And we generate several pieces of evidence indicating that corporate crime
is on the rise. Second, we identify flaws in enforcement practices that are
likely responsible for this underdeterrence, and in particular, an overreliance
on fines as the primary penalty. We recognize, however, that our crude
proxies do not allow us to precisely identify the aspects of the U.S.
enforcement regime that are failing us nor the appropriate course of action to
correct it. Therefore, our principal policy recommendation is for the
government to treat corporate crime like any other type of crime and measure
it. If our results are confirmed with further study, the normative implications
are clear: enforcement agencies should increase the deterrence punch of each
penalty by moving beyond fines and pursuing culpable individuals. We
recognize that it is often difficult to charge individuals, and especially the top
executives who are insulated from the commission of the crime, which may
explain the dearth of actions against them. Indeed, we view this as a principal
failing of the federal corporate crime enforcement regime and one that very
likely contributes to the trends that we observe. Therefore, in Part III, we
discuss one potential path forward: a new cause of action that would make it
easier for prosecutors to pursue executives who facilitate crimes by lowerlevel employees.
Our Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the U.S. enforcement
regime and notable trends over the past decade, including declining corporate
and individual prosecutions and (until 2018) rising fines. It then notes the
puzzling absence of reported crime rates, the principal tool used to evaluate
criminal enforcement in other areas and offers some theories as to why such
data does not exist. Part II describes our proxy data and results that indicate
that corporate crime is on the rise. Part III discusses implications for
lawmakers. It urges the government to make additional data available for
researchers to study and further contends that enforcement agencies should
move beyond entity-level fines as the primary mechanism for punishment.
I.

Corporate Criminal Enforcement
In the United States, corporations can be held criminally liable for
crimes committed by agents in the scope of employment through the doctrine

29. See, e.g., CORP. FRAUD TASK FORCE, SECOND YEAR REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT (2004),
https://www.justice.gov/archive/dag/cftf/2nd_yr_fraud_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KDB25MGZ] (outlining the actions taken by the Corporate Fraud Task Force in 2004, including criminal
and civil enforcement actions); TRANSACTIONAL RECS. ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (TRAC), http://
trac.syr.edu/ [https://perma.cc/HLH3-NRAJ] (providing “comprehensive, independent and
nonpartisan information about federal enforcement”). Some have also relied on survey data to
attempt to estimate base rates of misconduct. See William S. Laufer, A Very Special Regulatory
Milestone, 20 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 392, 421 n.90 (2017) (relying on survey data of observed misconduct
by employees). See supra section II(B)(2) for a discussion of this approach and its flaws.
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of respondeat superior.30 When we discuss “corporate crime,” we are
referring to crimes committed by corporate agents that could be attributed to
the entity under this doctrine. If convicted of a crime, the corporate entity can
be subject to a wide range of penalties, including fines, restitution,
community service, and a loss of charter (of course, the guilty agents can also
be subject to liability).31
In this Part, we describe major trends in federal corporate criminal
enforcement in the past two decades. We then consider whether these
enforcement practices could be consistent with optimal deterrence under law
and economics theory. Finally, we observe a unique aspect of corporate
criminal law scholarship: while legal scholars elsewhere study changes in
underlying crime rates to evaluate enforcement, corporate criminal law
scholars work backwards, studying enforcement to glean insights about crime
rates.
A.

Enforcement Data

This subpart provides data showcasing major trends in enforcement
practice over the past two decades. To summarize, since the early 2000s,
enforcement agencies have pursued fewer cases against corporations,
brought fewer actions against individuals, increased the number of
settlements, and obtained increasingly higher fines.32 First, corporate
prosecutions and convictions have been steadily falling. For example, the
number of corporate prosecutions filed by the DOJ fell 29% between 2004

30. V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 1477, 1489 (1996).
31. See id. at 1529 (explaining the range of penalties that exist for corporate criminals). Of
course, criminal prosecutions are not the only way to encourage socially beneficial corporate
behavior. New regulation and compliance systems to enforce them can help address problems like
financial misconduct, workplace sexual harassment, etc. However, the empirical evidence suggests
that the efficacy of these ex ante compliance management systems is limited. See Cary Coglianese
& Jennifer Nash, Compliance Management Systems: Do They Make a Difference?, in CAMBRIDGE
HANDBOOK OF COMPLIANCE 571, 581 (Benjamin van Rooij & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2021) (“The
evidence overall is limited and mixed. Some existing empirical research supports the theoretical
expectation that [compliance management systems] can improve compliance, but other research
also tends to reinforce a degree of skepticism about whether formal compliance systems lead to
substantial improvements.”). Therefore, corporate criminal law has developed to fill a gap between
criminal law and corporate regulation. Samuel W. Buell, Criminally Bad Management, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE CRIME AND FINANCIAL MISDEALING 59, 60 (Jennifer
Arlen ed., 2018) [hereinafter Buell, Criminally Bad Management].
32. Note that this Article focuses on enforcement at the federal level, where “the most
significant and complex cases have long been brought.” Brandon L. Garrett, Declining Corporate
Prosecutions, 57 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 109, 110–11 (2020) [hereinafter Garrett, Declining Corporate
Prosecutions].
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and 2014.33 This trend has continued since then, and in 2018, the number of
corporate convictions fell to ninety-nine, breaking a record for the lowest
number ever recorded.34
Second, although the number of prosecutions has declined, the number
of settlements has increased—especially among the largest companies.35
From 2006 to 2019, for example, only twelve corporations were convicted
after a trial.36 Traditionally, the DOJ would settle cases with companies using
a plea agreement after charges were filed in court.37 Today, an increasing
share of corporate criminal enforcement actions are settled without a plea,
using non-prosecution agreements, or “NPAs,” and deferred prosecution
agreements, or “DPAs.”38 The use of these settlements reached a high point
of 101 in 2015, which represented approximately a tenfold increase from
2005.39 That number has since fallen somewhat, but the percentage of
corporate criminal cases that are settled remains much higher than early-2000
levels.40 Relatedly, the number of corporate declinations, where the DOJ

33. Justice Department Data Reveal 29 Percent Drop in Criminal Prosecutions of
Corporations, TRAC REPORTS (Oct. 13, 2015), https://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/406/ [https://
perma.cc/HQH4-L8HK]; see also Garrett, Declining Corporate Prosecutions, supra note 32, at
121–23 (noting the DOJ’s softening of its corporate prosecution policy from the later years of the
Obama Administration into the Trump Administration).
34. RICK CLAYPOOL, PUB. CITIZEN, SOFT ON CORPORATE CRIME: DOJ REFUSES TO
PROSECUTE CORPORATE LAWBREAKERS, FAILS TO DETER REPEAT OFFENDERS 9 (2019), https://
mkus3lurbh3lbztg254fzode-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/soft-on-corporatecrime-dpa-npa-repeat-offenders-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/E4CT-6PFM].
35. See id. at 5, 15 (arguing that the largest companies are treated most leniently and contending
that this is the result of the Holder Doctrine, which directed prosecutors to consider “potential
adverse effects on a corporation’s shareholders and employees when deciding whether to bring
charges against a corporation”).
36. Id. at 36–38.
37. See Bruce H. Kobayashi, Case Selection, External Effects, and the Trial/Settlement
Decision, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BRIDGING THE SETTLEMENT GAP 17, 17 (David A. Anderson
ed., 1996) (noting the efficiency gains from settlement versus trial in the case of corporations).
38. The main difference between NPAs and DPAs is that DPAs require charges to be filed in
court—the prosecutor agrees to defer the prosecution of charges during a predefined time period.
By contrast, NPAs are not required to be filed in court, and therefore, the judge does not approve
the terms of the settlement. Jennifer Arlen & Marcel Kahan, Corporate Governance Regulation
Through Nonprosecution, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 323, 332–33 (2017). For a critique of these tools, see
Jennifer Arlen, Prosecuting Beyond the Rule of Law: Corporate Mandates Imposed Through
Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 191 (2016). Note that the rise in DPAs
and NPAs has also corresponded with an increase in imposition of a corporate monitor, which helps
ensure compliance at the firm going forward. Vikramaditya Khanna & Timothy L. Dickinson, The
Corporate Monitor: The New Corporate Czar?, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1713, 1714, 1740–41 (2007).
39. CLAYPOOL, supra note 34, at 7. By contrast, the DOJ almost never settles charges against
individual offenders using a DPA or NPA. See id. at 5 (showing that less than 1% of individuals
received “pre-trial diversions from federal prosecutors” in 2018).
40. Garrett, Declining Corporate Prosecutions, supra note 32, at 132. As Brandon Garrett
explains:
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determines that a case has merit but is not pursued because of the company’s
“voluntary disclosure, full cooperation, remediation, and payment of
disgorgement, forfeiture, and/or restitution,”41 are rising for FCPA cases.42
This type of settlement is especially lenient for defendants, as the government
essentially determines that it will not take on a case that it thinks has merit.43
Figure 1: Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements
(Share of Total Prosecutions)44
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Third, individuals are rarely charged when charges are settled. In a study
of DPAs and NPAs entered into from 2001 to 2014, Brandon Garrett found
that only 34% involved individual prosecutions. 45 Most of those individuals
were low-level employees.46 This is true outside of the settlement context as
[T]he main reason [for the 2015 increase] is the large number of non-prosecution
agreements entered in 2015 with Swiss banks as part of a program to offer lenient
settlements rewarding self-reporting and cooperation. None of those cases involved
individual charges filed, including for practical and jurisdictional reasons, as the banks
tended to be small or mid-sized Swiss banks (albeit ones providing tax shelters to U.S.
taxpayers).
Id. (footnote omitted).
41. Id. at 119.
42. Id. at 119–20.
43. Id. at 119.
44. Garrett, Corporate Prosecution Registry, supra note 15.
45. Brandon L. Garrett, The Corporate Criminal as Scapegoat, 101 VA. L. REV. 1789, 1791
(2015) [hereinafter Garrett, Corporate Criminal as Scapegoat].
46. Id. However, individual employees can be implicated in wrongdoing in the settlement
documents. Asaf Eckstein & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Reverse Agency Problem in the Age of
Compliance 4 (U. of Penn. L. Sch. Inst. for L. & Econ., Research Paper No. 19-38, 2019), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3460064 [https://perma.cc/2WAT-AS24]. And these
admissions can lead to reputational harm and expose the individuals to follow-on civil suits. Id.
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well. Even in the wake of the Yates memo, which admonished enforcement
agencies to pursue individuals more often,47 not much changed—“[i]f
anything, individual charging has declined in the years since [the memo] was
adopted.”48 In addition, the Trump Administration amended the Yates memo
to emphasize that investigations should not be delayed “merely to collect
information about individuals whose involvement was not substantial, and
who are not likely to be prosecuted.”49 As a result, in 2018, white-collar
prosecutions fell to their lowest level in twenty years.50 Even when
individuals are charged, they are more likely than not to get off without jail
time: Of the 414 individuals prosecuted from 2001 to 2014, only 30.9%
received a prison sentence.51

Gaining a better understanding of these effects will be important for calibrating deterrence going
forward.
47. Memorandum from Sally Yates, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., on Individual
Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing to All U.S. Att’ys 1–2 (Sept. 9, 2015), https://
www.justice.gov/archives/dag/file/769036/download [https://perma.cc/Y7BV-Y5NR] (advising
attorneys to focus on individuals in criminal and civil investigations, since “[o]ne of the most
effective ways to combat corporate misconduct is by seeking accountability from the individuals
who perpetrated the wrongdoing”).
48. Garrett, Declining Corporate Prosecutions, supra note 32, at 133.
49. Rod Rosenstein, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Remarks at the American
Conference Institute’s 35th International Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 29,
2018),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-rod-j-rosenstein-deliversremarks-american-conference-institute-0 [https://perma.cc/2V8N-LTE8]; see also U.S. Dep’t
of Just., U.S. Att’ys’ Manual § 9-28.210 (2018), https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-28000principles-federal-prosecution-business-organizations#9-28.210 [https://perma.cc/8K8P-EGRC]
(“Prosecutors should not allow delays in the corporate investigation to undermine the Department’s
ability to pursue potentially culpable individuals.”).
50. See White Collar Prosecutions Fall to Lowest in 20 Years, TRAC REPORTS (May 24, 2018),
https://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/514/ [https://perma.cc/B364-UJXF] (finding that in 2018 the
number of criminal white-collar criminal prosecutions fell 4.4% from the previous year and 40.8%
from 1998).
51. See Garrett, Corporate Criminal as Scapegoat, supra note 45, at 1791–92 (finding that only
128 of the 414 individuals prosecuted received a prison sentence).
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Figure 2: DPAs and NPAs with Corresponding Individual Suits
(Share of Total)52
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Fourth and finally, although individual punishment has declined, entitylevel fines have steadily increased over the past two decades, falling off
slightly to return to precrisis levels in 2018. This reversal in a decades-long
trend toward increased fines is reflective of a skeptical DOJ attitude toward
large financial penalties. In 2018, then-Deputy Attorney General Rod
Rosenstein stated that corporate prosecutions should “avoid imposing
penalties that disproportionately punish innocent employees, shareholders,
customers and other stakeholders.”53 In a separate speech, he described a new
policy that would help enforcement agencies avoid the “piling on” that occurs
when multiple regulators impose fines involving the same conduct, again, out
of a concern for “innocent employees and shareholders.”54

52. Garrett, Corporate Prosecution Registry, supra note 15. The year 2015 shows a slight
increase from the previous years, but we view this as an anomalous year, because this is the year
where the DOJ rolled out its Swiss Bank Program targeting banks that sheltered U.S. income. That
program allowed banks to secure NPAs in exchange for disclosure of information relating to those
accounts, which accounts for both the increase of individual prosecutions as well as the recordbreaking total of DPAs and NPAs in that year. See supra note 40.
53. Rod Rosenstein, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at the 32nd Annual
ABA National Institute on White Collar Crime (Mar. 2, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech
/deputy-attorney-general-rosenstein-delivers-remarks-32nd-annual-aba-national-institute [https://
perma.cc/7XWS-PJJL]; Ben Protess, Robert Gebeloff & Danielle Ivory, Trump Administration
Spares Corporate Wrongdoers Billions in Penalties, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/11/03/us/trump-sec-doj-corporate-penalties.html [https://perma.cc/6DJ4H5V4].
54. Rosenstein, supra note 49.
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Figure 3: Aggregate Annual Corporate Criminal Penalties for All Prosecutions55
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In sum, over the past two decades, the DOJ has generally forgone
individual liability in favor of entity liability, favored settlements over trials,
and until 2018, sought higher and higher fines.
If we look at the subset of prosecutions that involve banks, these trends
are especially stark. Before 2008, banks were rarely prosecuted. That
changed in the wake of the financial crisis, where the DOJ secured a number
of record-breaking fines against financial institutions. 56 Indeed, nearly $7
billion of the total $9 billion paid in corporate penalties in 2015 came from
financial institutions.57 But these penalties are composed of a handful of
blockbuster cases—the overall number of prosecutions has generally
remained steady in the past few years, and it has fallen since 2017. 58 In

55. Garrett, Corporate Prosecution Registry, supra note 15. Note that the penalty amount is the
total of fines paid to the U.S. government, and does not include amounts paid to settle investor
lawsuits or to foreign governments.
56. We use Brandon Garrett’s definition for financial institutions, which includes “a range of
types of companies that focus on financial transactions, including commercial banks, investment
banks, insurance companies, and brokerages.” Garrett, Corporate Criminal as Scapegoat, supra
note 45, at 1816.
57. Garrett, Declining Corporate Prosecutions, supra note 32, at 116, 123. Most of these bank
settlements were part of the Swiss Bank Program discussed in note 40.
58. Garrett, Declining Corporate Prosecutions, supra note 32, at 115 (noting that in the last
twenty months of the Obama Administration, seventy-one financial institutions were prosecuted,
while only seventeen financial institutions were prosecuted during the first twenty months of the
Trump Administration, excluding legacy cases filed during the Obama Administration).
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addition, the vast majority of fines were secured via settlement, rather than
after trial and conviction.59
Figure 4. Financial Institution Penalties, 2001–201860

In addition, when banks are pursued, individual bankers are rarely
charged. As Judge Jed Rakoff complained, as of 2014, no high-level
executives had been successfully prosecuted in connection with the financial
crisis.61 From 2001 to 2014, of the sixty-six DPAs and NPAs entered into
with financial institutions, only twenty-three cases, or 35%, featured
individual prosecutions.62 Most of these involved low-level employees.63 For
59. Garrett, Corporate Prosecution Registry, supra note 15.
60. Garrett, Declining Corporate Prosecutions, supra note 32, at 123 fig.2.
61. Rakoff, Why Have No High-Level Executives Been Prosecuted?, supra note 3. Only one
mid-level banking executive went to jail in the wake of the financial crisis. Jesse Eisinger, Why Only
One Top Banker Went to Jail for the Financial Crisis, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Apr. 30, 2014), https://
www.nytimes.com/2014/05/04/magazine/only-one-top-banker-jail-financial-crisis.html [https://
perma.cc/76GK-W73N].
62. Garrett, Corporate Criminal as Scapegoat, supra note 45, at 1815–16. Brandon Garrett
observes:
Those cases involved deferred and non-prosecution agreements with Baystar Capital
Management LLC (fraud); ConvergEx Group, LLC (securities fraud); Deutsche Bank
AG (tax fraud); Diamondback Capital Management LLC (securities fraud); GE
Funding Capital Market Services, Inc. (FCPA); German Bank HVB (tax fraud);
Jefferies Group LLC (fraud); JPMorgan Chase & Co. (antitrust); Louis Berger Group
(fraud); Mellon Bank, N.A. (theft); Merrill Lynch (false statements); Mirant Energy
Trading (false commodities reporting); NETeller PLC (illegal gambling); Omega
Advisors (FCPA); Prudential Equity Group (securities fraud); Rabobank (wire fraud);
and UBS AG (three separate cases involving tax fraud, antitrust, and wire fraud).
Id. at 1816 n.110.
63. Garrett, Bank Prosecutions, supra note 3, at 44.
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certain types of financial institution crime, there is a complete dearth of
individual prosecution. As an example, no individual employees or officers
were prosecuted in cases involving alleged violations of the Bank Secrecy
Act, which proscribes money laundering.64
B.

Evaluating Enforcement
Is the current U.S. federal enforcement regime, with its emphasis on
large fines and lack of individual liability, supplying adequate deterrence?
The answer to this question is subject to much debate. On the one hand, many
politicians,65 judges,66 academics,67 and journalists68 are skeptical. For
example, Judge Jed Rakoff has been a vocal critic of prosecutorial efforts in
the wake of the 2008 financial crisis.69 As discussed, the DOJ under the
Trump Administration has taken the opposite view, adopting policies that
decrease the likelihood of individual prosecutions70 and limit the size of fines
and other penalties in favor of securing “reasonable and proportionate

64. Garrett, Corporate Criminal as Scapegoat, supra note 45, at 1816. As Federal District Judge
Emmett G. Sullivan stated when considering a DPA against Barclays Bank PLC for Bank Secrecy
Act violations: “No one goes to jail, no one is indicted, no individuals are mentioned as far as I can
determine . . . there’s no personal responsibility.” Id. at 1817.
65. See, e.g., Corporate Executive Accountability Act, S. 1010, 116th Cong. (2019) (proposing
the establishment of criminal liability for negligent executive officers of corporations).
66. See, e.g., Rakoff, Why Have No High-Level Executives Been Prosecuted?, supra note 3, at
8 (suggesting that the “future deterrent value” of prosecuting individuals would outweigh the
“prophylactic benefits” of internal compliance measures).
67. See, e.g., BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE
WITH CORPORATIONS 18 (2014) (“We need to look beyond the press releases announcing eyecatching fines and ask whether adequate criminal punishment is imposed and whether structural
reforms are working.”); Samuel W. Buell, The Responsibility Gap in Corporate Crime, 12 CRIM.
L. & PHIL. 471, 475 (2018) (suggesting that using criminal law to deter corporate wrongdoing
compromises the principles of wrongdoing); Garrett, Declining Corporate Prosecutions, supra note
32, at 135–37, 144 (“[I]f we still have not learned the lessons of the last financial crisis, the next
one cannot be far ahead.”); Garrett, Corporate Criminal as Scapegoat, supra note 45, 1790–91,
1796 (“[F]ar too many corporate cases lack individual prosecutions.”).
68. See, e.g., JESSE EISINGER, THE CHICKENSHIT CLUB: WHY THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT
FAILS TO PROSECUTE EXECUTIVES, at xvii (2017) (“Today’s Department of Justice has lost the will
and indeed the ability to go after the highest-ranking corporate wrongdoers.”).
69. See Rakoff, Why Have No High-Level Executives Been Prosecuted?, supra note 3, at 6; Jed
S. Rakoff, Justice Deferred Is Justice Denied, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 19, 2015, at 8, 10 https://
www.nybooks.com/articles/2015/02/19/justice-deferred-justice-denied/ [https://perma.cc/UE5KSS7S] (“But the broader point . . . is that for the past decade or more, as a result of the shift from
prosecuting high-level individuals to entering into ‘cosmetic’ prosecution agreements with their
companies, the punishment and deterrence of corporate crime has, for all the government’s rhetoric,
effectively been reduced.”).
70. See Garrett, Declining Corporate Prosecutions, supra note 32, at 110–12 (“In 2017 and
2018, however, the DOJ made a series of policy changes designed to reduce the impact of criminal
prosecution on corporations.”).
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outcomes in major corporate investigations.”71 In this subpart, we first briefly
consider how the DOJ’s efforts fare under law and economics theory. We
then discuss a puzzling divergence between the corporate criminal law
literature and that of public-order crime: a lack of empirical study of
corporate crime rates.
1. Theory.—The principal aim of corporate criminal liability is
deterrence—other goals, such as retribution or incapacitation, make less
sense when the subject of the penalty is a legal entity. Therefore, law and
economics scholars have been influential in theorizing how to efficiently
deter corporate misconduct. And under the classic model for criminal
enforcement developed by Gary Becker, high fines might well be the most
efficient way to deter crime.72 Under Becker’s model, identifying the optimal
level of criminal enforcement requires comparing the benefits to society from
punishing and deterring crime with the costs of catching and punishing
offenders.73 Therefore, punishment by fine might deter crime most efficiently
because fines avoid the social costs created by other forms of punishment,
such as imprisonment. In sum, according to Becker’s model, fines are
sufficient, and even preferable, so long as they are set equal to the social cost
of crime multiplied by the probability of detection.74
However, this is not how fines are calculated.75 The sentencing
guidelines instead require the organization to remedy harm and then set the
fine range based on “the seriousness of the offense” (reflected by the amount

71. Rod Rosenstein, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Remarks to the New York City Bar
White Collar Crime Institute (May 9, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorneygeneral-rod-rosenstein-delivers-remarks-new-york-city-bar-white-collar [https://perma.cc/G7XBJ2FR].
72. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169,
170 (1968) (stating that the optimal penalty should adjust to reflect the “cost of catching and
convicting offenders, the nature of punishments—for example, whether they are fines or prison
terms—and the responses of offenders to changes in enforcement”); see also Daniel R. Fischel &
Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319, 324 (1996) (“[F]irms will then anticipate
a penalty equal to the social cost of their agents’ crimes, so that the private gains from monitoring
and the social gains will converge.”).
73. Becker, supra note 72.
74. Id.; see also A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Enforcement Costs and the Optimal
Magnitude and Probability of Fines, 35 J.L. & ECON. 133, 133 (1992) (“The optimal fine equals
the harm, properly inflated for the chance of not being detected, plus the variable enforcement cost
of imposing the fine.” (emphasis omitted)); Posner, supra note 21 (arguing that the probability and
severity of crimes must be considered for fines to be effective deterrents).
75. See Arlen, Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 25, at 189. Professor Arlen writes:
Nevertheless, current practice does not fit all the requirements of an optimal corporate liability
system in that federal authorities have not adopted clear guidelines to ensure that civil regulators
and the DOJ impose optimal residual sanctions on firms—sanctions that take full account of the
variety of ways in which firms bear the social costs of crime.
Id.
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of pecuniary loss) as well as the corporation’s “culpability.”76 Organizational
culpability is based on, “(i) the involvement in or tolerance of criminal
activity; (ii) the prior history of the organization; (iii) the violation of an
order; and (iv) the obstruction of justice.”77 The guidelines also allow penalty
mitigation whenever the company has “an effective compliance and ethics
program” or cooperates with authorities.78 In other words, the sentencing
guidelines adjust penalties based on culpability rather than the probability of
nondetection.79 And the fact that fines are often decreased as a reward for
compliance rather than multiplied to compensate for the low probability of
punishment suggests that fines alone will not supply adequate deterrence.
More importantly, time has revealed flaws in the Beckerian model. In
particular, Jennifer Arlen and Renier Kraakman have argued that “the state
cannot deter misconduct simply by setting liability high enough to ensure that
firms cannot profit from it.”80 Their position is that individual liability is a
necessary component of corporate criminal enforcement because entity-level
fines are unlikely to burden employees who are not shareholders, or who have
small stakes in the company.81 Instead, employees will be motivated to
commit crimes that increase corporate profitability so long as the chance of
detection is low because doing so will allow employees to reap personal
benefits—increased job security, higher pay, and promotion.82

76. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(21) background (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
77. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 8, introductory cmt. (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
78. Id. For a critique of this mitigation system, see Jennifer Arlen, The Failure of the
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, 66 U. MIA. L. REV. 321, 325 (2012) [hereinafter Arlen,
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines].
79. Of course, as the previous Part made clear, most fines are imposed not by courts, but by
agencies pursuant to a settlement. However, most settlements provide a guidelines-informed fine
range, indicating that the guidelines are affecting the determination of the fine size. ALEXANDER,
TRENDS IN THE USE OF NON-PROSECUTION, supra note 4, at 38–41. This same study found that the
base guideline fine was higher for DPAs and NPAs, but there was also much more variability across
crimes that were the subject of DPAs and NPAs. Id. at x (finding base fines of $189 million and
$219 million for DPAs and NPAs, respectively, as compared to the $75.7 million for pleas at the
mean).
80. Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 28, at 690–91.
81. See id. at 700 n.30 (“Shareholders of publicly held firms may be less able to rely on
managers to implement optimal preventive and policing measures because managers bear much of
the cost of prevention and policing but do not directly bear the firm’s expected liability for any
wrongdoing that occurs. Thus, in these cases all corporate liability regimes become less attractive
on the margin.”).
82. See Arlen, Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 25, at 159, 170–71 (discussing why the
government cannot rely on corporate liability alone to optimally deter crime by employees of
publicly held firms); Jonathan R. Macey, Agency Theory and the Criminal Liability of
Organizations, 71 B.U. L. REV. 315, 325 (1991); Cindy R. Alexander & Mark A. Cohen, Why Do
Corporations Become Criminals? Ownership, Hidden Actions, and Crime as an Agency Cost, 5 J.
CORP. FIN. 1, 30–31 (1999) (discussing the efficacy of management in monitoring and deterring
criminal activity).
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Therefore, under Arlen and Kraakman’s model, it is critical that the
government detect and punish individual wrongdoing. However, information
asymmetries limit the government’s ability to do this.83 Therefore, entity
liability can be usefully employed to induce companies to produce
information that would help the government detect and punish guilty
individuals.84 According to Arlen, an optimal enforcement regime would
enlist companies to detect crime, identify wrongdoers, and report to federal
agencies, therefore making it easier for the government to pursue and convict
guilty individuals.85
Arlen’s precept that cooperation between firms and enforcement
agencies can be used as a means of punishing and deterring bad actors has
not been embraced by the DOJ. Instead, as the previous subpart reveals, the
government has mostly abandoned individual-level punishment.86 When the
government prosecutes employees, it primarily pursues only low-level
actors.87 This disparity is likely because it is very difficult to successfully
prosecute top executives.88 In addition, it may be unrealistic to rely on
corporate cooperation as the primary mechanism for accountability because
management will likely be motivated to shelter employees, especially their
top executive colleagues. Therefore, viewed from the lens of law and

83. Becker would advise that punishment could be increased to account for infrequent detection;
however, even he recognized that if the probability of detection is low enough, the optimal sanction
will exceed the amount that can be optimally imposed on individuals given that they will likely be
judgment proof, and that prison imposes high social costs. See Becker, supra note 72, at 196–97
(making this argument). Behavioral economics further shows that because individuals often
discount low probability events to zero, rare punishments may not adequately deter individuals. Eric
A. Posner, Probability Errors: Some Positive and Normative Implications for Tort and Contract
Law, 11 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 125, 127–28 (2004).
84. Jennifer Arlen, The Potential Promise and Perils of Introducing Deferred Prosecution
Agreements Outside the U.S., in NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENTS IN BRIBERY CASES: A PRINCIPLED
APPROACH 156, 160 (Tina Søreide & Abiola Makinwa eds., 2020) [hereinafter Arlen, Promise and
Perils]; see also Arlen, Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 78, at 322 (“[T]he
government cannot effectively deter corporate crime by large firms on its own. Federal authorities
need to induce firms to help them detect and sanction.”).
85. Because corporate policing measures are costly, the government should find ways to induce
companies to do it, such as by promising that firms that do not cooperate or police misconduct will
face higher sanctions. See Arlen & Kahan, supra note 38, 346–47 (“A regime in which corporate
liability is duty based—such that firms with deficient policing face higher sanctions—can provide
firms with the requisite incentive to adopt optimal policing.”).
86. See supra notes 60–64 and accompanying text.
87. See Garrett, Bank Prosecutions, supra note 3, at 44 (concluding that in prosecutions
involving banks, the individuals prosecuted were usually “low-level employees”).
88. Buell, Criminally Bad Management, supra note 31, at 70 (“The most common observations
about the limitations of criminal prosecutions with respect to senior corporate managers are that
cases are hard to win and there have not been enough of them to make a difference.”).
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economics theory, it is unlikely that the federal enforcement regime is
optimally deterring crime.89
2. Data.—In other areas of criminal law, theory is bolstered by data
analysis. Although theory is certainly important for predicting how and
understanding why certain enforcement practices affect criminal behavior,
these conversations progress alongside an evaluation of how changes in
enforcement affect overall crime rates.90 To take an infamous example,
consider the “broken windows” theory and the literature it generated. In
1982, James Wilson and George Kelling suggested that targeting
misdemeanor offenses could reduce more serious crime.91 This idea caught
on like wildfire, influencing the enforcement practices of police in New
York, Chicago, and Los Angeles, with some apparent success—crime rates
mostly declined in these places.92 But an exhaustive literature evaluating the
link between the implementation of a broken windows policy and falling
crime rates soon cast doubt on the efficacy of this theory, and by the early
2000s, multiple empirical studies had concluded that there was little evidence
to support the claim that broken windows policing contributed to the sharp
decrease in crime in the 1990s.93
By contrast, the corporate criminal law literature tends not to evaluate
enforcement based on changes in crime rates. What explains the divergence
between these two areas of scholarship? The principal cause is the fact that
the government does not provide estimates of corporate crime levels, as it
does for other types of crime, making it difficult to study. Likewise, the
government does not attempt to measure aggregate levels of white-collar
crime—the last time the government issued a comprehensive report of whitecollar crime was in 1986, and this report summarized the characteristics of

89. Cf. id. at 60 (positing that corporate criminal liability is used by the DOJ to effect changes
in managerial practices, in order to deter “criminally bad management” when pursuing executive
liability is not a possible option); Arlen & Kahan, supra note 38, at 328 (discussing how governance
reform can be used whenever “[p]olicing agency costs” exist that allow senior management to
benefit from wrongdoing or defective policing).
90. See generally Aaron Chalfin & Justin McCrary, Criminal Deterrence: A Review of the
Literature, 55 J. ECON. LIT. 5 (2017) (analyzing research regarding how policing practices and
punishment affect crime rates).
91. George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood
Safety, ATLANTIC (Mar. 1982), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/brokenwindows/304465/ [https://perma.cc/QU6E-UL53].
92. Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence from New York City
and a Five-City Social Experiment, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 271, 272 & n.3 (2006).
93. Id. at 315 (finding “no empirical evidence to support the view that shifting police towards
minor disorder offenses would improve the efficiency of police spending and reduce violent
crime”).
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enforcement actions against white-collar criminals.94 Compare this dearth of
data to the statistics that are available for public-order crime: each year, both
the FBI and the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) collect data and present
reports documenting the number of murders, rapes, sexual assaults,
robberies, and assaults. The FBI collects this information by pooling reports
by law enforcement agencies on a monthly basis; the BJS collects data by
interviewing roughly 160,000 people in 95,000 households.95
Given the significance of corporate crime and its adverse economic
consequences, it is certainly surprising that there has been no recent
government attempt to estimate overall corporate crime rates. There are
likely a few reasons why. First, the act of tallying corporate crime is more
difficult than that of tallying public-order crime. When windows break, glass
shatters; corporate crime, by contrast, can be difficult to observe. Not only
that, but as Samuel Buell explains, violent crime tends to be more easily
specified than white-collar crime, the latter of which tends to be defined
under amorphous and broad criminal statutes.96 Consider corporate fraud as
an example. Some is easy to recognize, like the fraud perpetrated by Bernard
Madoff. Other frauds are more difficult to determine. For example, what
about an executive who technically complies with accounting rules but bends
them in a way that ends up misleading shareholders about the financial health
of the company? In the case of WorldCom CEO Bernard Ebbers, this was

94. MANSON, supra note 4 (showing that the last estimate of white-collar crime was in 1986).
The FBI released its own report of white-collar crime in 2000, which was based on FBI arrest
records. CYNTHIA BARNETT, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, NCJ
202866, MEASUREMENT OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIME USING UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING (UCR)
DATA (2000), https://ucr.fbi.gov/nibrs/nibrs_wcc.pdf [https://perma.cc/48VJ-N4CW]. This report
provides only broad categories for white-collar crime and does not enable researchers to distinguish
between credit card theft and massive corporate malfeasance, nor does it distinguish between
individual crime and corporate crime that could be attributed to the entity. Id.
95. Violent Crime, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Feb. 18, 2021), https://
www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=31 [https://perma.cc/NX2X-MP4F]. Note that these databases
have problems of their own: for example, there can be disagreement across jurisdictions about what
offenses count as criminal activity, and this means that, from time to time, each database has
presented a different picture of the overall crime rate. See Gary F. Jensen & MaryAltani Karpos,
Managing Rape: Exploratory Research on the Behavior of Rape Statistics, 31 CRIMINOLOGY 363
(1993) (analyzing how the disparity in rape rates reported by two different crime databases suggests
the databases either measure a distinct phenomenon or have methodological problems that preclude
an adequate comparison). The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine has
convened a panel to modernize these data collection efforts so that they are more accurate. NAT’L
ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., MODERNIZING CRIME STATISTICS: REPORT 2–NEW SYSTEMS
FOR MEASURING CRIME (Janet L. Lauritsen & Daniel L. Cork eds., 2018), https://www.nap.edu
/read/25035/ [https://perma.cc/Q78N-9EFY].
96. Samuel W. Buell, “White Collar” Crimes, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW
837, 837, 841–42 (Markus D. Dubber & Tatjana Hörnle eds., 2014) [hereinafter Buell, “White
Collar” Crimes].
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deemed criminal behavior despite his argument that he had broken no law.97
Ultimately, the act of estimating corporate crime rates may require a number
of difficult judgment calls about the types of misconduct that count as
criminal.
Second and relatedly, public-order crimes tend to have identifiable and
sympathetic victims, and those victims aid in statistical collection by
reporting crime. For white-collar crime, by contrast, “the class of victims is
typically diffuse, in the sense of being spread far and wide and standing at
some distance removed in a chain of causation from the acts of the principal
offender, whom the victims may never see, deal with, or even identify.”98
This is not always the case: in the high profile cases of fraud, such as the
Wells Fargo fake account scandal, the victims were easily identifiable and
could alert regulators to misconduct.99 Compare such fraud to the typical
FCPA violation, where a company pays a bribe to a foreign government in
order to secure a contract. There, the harm is quite diffuse—as then-President
Jimmy Carter explained when he signed the bill, “[c]orrupt practices between
corporations and public officials overseas undermine the integrity and
stability of governments and harm our relations with other countries.”100 In
the case of a bribe, there will not always be victims who are poised to file a
report.
We recognize that these hurdles to corporate crime data collection exist,
but do not view them as entirely insurmountable. Although certain violent
crimes are fairly easy to observe and measure, not all are. Consider rape as
an example. Often, rape goes unreported; even when the victim reports,
determining whether a rape occurred may require judgment calls about
whether there was consent.101 In addition, the answer may differ depending
on the law of the particular jurisdiction, complicating the job of estimating
an underlying rate. But these limitations do not stop the government from
supplying an estimate each year. In Part III, with full recognition of the
97. Id. at 842. There are other legal nuances that complicate the act of tallying. White-collar
cases tend to turn on questions of mens rea (whether the defendant had a guilty state of mind) more
often than violent crimes, which generally focus on questions of actus reus (whether the defendant
committed the prohibited act). Id. at 844–45.
98. Id. at 840.
99. See Matt Egan, 5,300 Wells Fargo Employees Fired Over 2 Million Phony Accounts,
CNN MONEY (Sept. 8, 2016, 3:07 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2016/09/08/investing/
wells-fargo-created-phony-accounts-bank-fees/index.html?iid=EL [https://perma.cc/S3L8-AMTP]
(exemplifying how fake accounts were associated with customers’ existing accounts).
100. Statement by President Jimmy Carter on Signing S. 305, the Foreign Corrupt Practices and
Investment Disclosure Bill, into Law (Dec. 20, 1977) [hereinafter Statement by President Jimmy
Carter], AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/243095 [https://
perma.cc/44JS-XLW6].
101. Buell, “White Collar” Crimes, supra note 96, at 842 (citing PETER WESTEN, THE LOGIC
OF CONSENT: THE DIVERSITY AND DECEPTIVENESS OF CONSENT AS A DEFENSE TO CRIMINAL
CONDUCT (2004)).
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complications inherent to this project, we discuss paths that the government
could take to provide data that would aid researchers in measuring corporate
crime rates.
In the meantime, despite the substantial limitations that complicate the
project of measuring corporate crime, several paths forward exist for
researchers. One approach is to rely on survey data.102 Indeed, public-order
crime data provided by the BJS is gleaned from surveys; private
organizations provide similar data for organizational crime. For example, the
Ethics Resource Center surveys employees “understand how they view ethics
and compliance at work.”103 Every few years, the center also polls employees
of Fortune 500 companies. These studies have been used by researchers to
argue that rates of corporate criminality are increasing.104 But a major
limitation with survey data is that respondents might not honestly answer
about their criminal behavior. This problem plagues researchers studying
violent crime,105 and there are a few reasons to think it would be an issue in
this context. For example, employees—whether they be low-level workers or
top executives—might feel pressure to give an overly rosy report about the
company’s compliance. Not only that, survey design is also enormously
important.106 Without careful planning, surveys can be plagued with
sampling errors and undercoverage issues.107 For an example of a possible
source of selection bias, the Ethics Resource Center survey is optional, and
most employees who are selected decline to fill it out, leading to the inference
that those who do submit answers have a reason to provide an especially
extreme view. For these reasons, we are reluctant to rely on a single survey
of corporate employees as an accurate measure of underlying crime rates.

102. Part III considers additional possibilities for researchers addressing this question.
103. ETHICS RES. CTR., NATIONAL BUSINESS ETHICS SURVEY OF FORTUNE 500® EMPLOYEES:
AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE STATE OF ETHICS AT AMERICA’S MOST POWERFUL COMPANIES
(2012), https://s3.amazonaws.com/berkley-center/120101NationalBusinessEthicsSurveyFortune
500Employees.pdf [https://perma.cc/GH4W-Q4PJ].
104. See William S. Laufer, A Very Special Regulatory Milestone, 20 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 392, 421
nn.88–91 (2017) (citing various surveys, including some by the Ethics Resource Center, that
indicate increasing prosecution and crime reporting rates). Private companies also supply survey
data about corporate criminal behavior. See, e.g., KROLL, GLOBAL FRAUD AND RISK REPORT 2019
/20 (2019), https://www.kroll.com/en/insights/publications/global-fraud-and-risk-report-2019
[https://perma.cc/MY84-Q7D6] (describing the risk management strategies used by business
executives).
105. See Terence P. Thornberry & Marvin D. Krohn, Comparison of Self-Report and Official
Data for Measuring Crime, in MEASUREMENT PROBLEMS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESEARCH 43, 63
(John V. Pepper & Carol V. Petrie eds., 2003) (observing that self-report data is generally valid but
“there appears to be a substantial degree of either concealing or forgetting past criminal behavior”).
106. Id. at 44, 46, 48 (describing the thirty-year evolution of self-report surveys in the domain
of criminal law and early methodological shortcomings).
107. See Jelke Bethlehem, Selection Bias in Web Surveys, 78 INT’L STAT. REV. 161, 161–62
(2010) (describing the methodological problems of surveys).
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We believe that researchers should instead identify and measure proxies
for corporate crime to supplement information gleaned from survey data.
Studying proxies for criminal misconduct avoids the problems that come
from asking researchers to measure crime that is generally unobservable,
rarely reported, or difficult to specify. Therefore, proxy data, though limited
by the fit between the proxy and criminal misconduct, offer a promising
avenue for scholars who seek to measure crime trends over time.
Corporate criminal scholars have generally relied on corporate criminal
enforcement as a proxy for crime levels—the number of prosecutions,
convictions, and settlements, as well as their terms.108 We are skeptical that
this information tells us much about underlying crime rates.109 Enforcement
data is subject to a host of exogenous variables: enforcement agency
priorities, enforcement resources, and technological advances, to name a
few.110 A rise in enforcement actions against corporate criminals could mean
a rise in underlying crime, or it could mean that the agency has decided to
take a tougher stance on corporate crime. The usefulness of enforcement as
a proxy for corporate criminal behavior is further diminished in our context
because we know of (and indeed aim to study the effect of) substantial
changes in enforcement over our sample period. Therefore, enforcement data
is a poor proxy for underlying rates of corporate crime.111
Researchers in finance have thus far identified a few alternative proxies
for financial misconduct: accounting restatements, securities class action
lawsuits, and auditing enforcement releases.112 These databases provide a
proxy for securities and accounting fraud and have been useful in establishing

108. See Garrett, Corporate Prosecution Registry, supra note 15 (providing information about
corporate criminal prosecutions).
109. Note that using enforcement to measure deterrence can also lead to perverse consequences.
Cf. EPA Water Enforcement: Are We on the Right Track? Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy
Pol’y, Nat. Res. and Regul. Affs. of the Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 108th Cong. 102 (2003) (statement
of Shelley H. Metzenbaum, Dir., Env’t Compliance Consortium) (“[E]ven when enforcement
targets are not formally established, agency staff tend to assume they must meet or exceed the
previous year’s enforcement levels. This can create a pressure to find enforcement cases just to meet
the target . . . .”).
110. See, e.g., Matthew Hutson, The Trouble with Crime Statistics, NEW YORKER (Jan. 9,
2020),
https://www.newyorker.com/culture/annals-of-inquiry/the-trouble-with-crime-statistics
[https://perma.cc/BSD2-SCQN] (describing how crime statistics are difficult to interpret).
111. Cf. Thornberry & Krohn, supra note 105, at 44 (“‘[T]he value of a crime rate for index
purposes decreases as the distance from the crime itself in terms of procedure increases.’ Thus,
prison data are less useful than court or police data as a measure of actual delinquent or criminal
behavior.” (citing Thorsten Sellin, The Basis of a Crime Index, 22 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 335,
346 (1931))).
112. See, e.g., Karpoff, supra note 9, at 129–30 (listing these databases that identify and report
on financial misconduct); Dyck, supra note 9, at 4–6 (describing the approach used by various
proxies to identify and measure financial misconduct).
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that only a tiny fraction of such fraud is detected and punished.113 Our
analysis in the next Part considers additional proxies for misconduct based
on reporting (both mandated and voluntary) by firm employees and their
customers. Our goal is to say something about corporate crime trends more
broadly, beyond the relatively narrow inquiry of this prior work.
II.

Corporate Crime on the Rise
In this Part, we identify three novel proxies for corporate criminal
behavior based on reported instances of misconduct. Specifically, we rely on
data from the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) Suspicious
Activity Reports (SARs), consumer complaints made to the CFPB, and
whistleblower complaints made to the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC). Each dataset in our sample is unique—it represents reports by
different groups of individuals made to different regulatory agencies and
implicates different types of misconduct. First, SARs are an anonymous
filing required by the Bank Secrecy Act to be filed whenever a bank
employee suspects a violation of that Act. Because our focus is on corporate
crime, we isolate those SARs that flag misconduct by bank employees.
Second, CFPB complaints are lodged by aggrieved customers of financial
products. Third, corporate employees file whistleblower tips with the SEC to
tip the agency off to possible corporate misconduct. In each subpart, we
describe these datasets and the trends that we observed over time. We explain
why we believe these proxies correlate with corporate criminality, and also
discuss the many problems that complicate and weaken our interpretation. In
the last subpart, we study public company recidivism, relying on enforcement
data from Brandon Garrett. In so doing, we are able to learn more about the
principal enforcement tool used by the DOJ—the fine—and whether or not
it is deterring future incidents of institutional crime.
A.

Suspicious Activity Reports
SARs are an anonymous mechanism to report financial crimes used by
institutions subject to the Bank Secrecy Act.114 The intuition behind the SAR
requirement is that financial institutions are best positioned to detect illegal

113. See, e.g., Arlen & Kahan, supra note 38, at 345 n.71 (citing Alexander Dyck, Adair Morse
& Luigi Zingales, Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?, 65 J. FIN. 2213, 2225–26 (2010))
(highlighting Dyck, Morse, and Zingales’s “data that suggest that industry regulators discover only
13 percent of fraud cases that come to light”).
114. See Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs), OFF. COMPTROLLER CURRENCY, https://
www.occ.treas.gov/topics/supervision-and-examination/bank-operations/financial-crime
/suspicious-activity-reports/index-suspicious-activity-reports.html [https://perma.cc/ZVK2-8E9T]
(describing the Bank Secrecy Act’s requirements for financial institutions in filing suspicious
activity reports).
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use of the financial system; as such, they should be enlisted in helping the
government root out financial crime.
SARs are required to be filed whenever an employee or other
individual115 suspects that an agent within the institution has attempted to
perform a transaction in furtherance of money laundering or other violation
of federal law.116 “Agent within the institution” is defined broadly to include
not only insiders, but also bank customers and suppliers.117 However,
suspicious transactions below a $5,000 threshold do not require a SAR.118
The failure to comply with SAR filing requirements is punishable by criminal
and civil penalties, including large fines, loss of the bank’s charter, and
imprisonment.119 As a result, all financial institutions train employees on how
to identify and flag suspicious activity.120
SARs are confidential, meaning that the person who is the subject of the
report is not told about it, nor is anyone outside of the institution privy to the
information. Any unauthorized disclosure is punishable as a criminal offense.
In addition, the SAR filer need not disclose their name and is awarded
immunity during the discovery process.121
A SAR describes the suspicious behavior, the crime categories to which
the behavior pertains,122 and the agent’s relationship with the institution.
115. Individuals other than bank employees have duties to file SARs, including stockbrokers,
insurance companies, and travel agencies. Steven Pelak, Putting the ‘Enforcement’ into the
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, HOLLAND & HART (Oct. 1, 2013), https://
www.hollandhart.com/putting-the-enforcement-into-the-financial-crimes-enforcement-network
[https://perma.cc/64NJ-WSUG].
116. Id.
117. What Is a Suspicious Activity Report?, THOMSON REUTERS, https://legal
.thomsonreuters.com/en/insights/articles/what-is-a-suspicious-activity-report
[https://perma.cc/
VFC8-JR5Z].
118. Generally, a SAR must be filed:
[I]f the transaction involves $5,000 or more and the covered institution or business
knows, suspects, or has reason to suspect that the transaction (or a pattern of
transactions of which the transaction is a part) (1) involves illegal gains or an effort to
evade federal law or regulation, (2) has no business or apparent lawful purpose or (3) is
not the sort in which the particular customer would normally be expected to engage.
Pelak, supra note 115.
119. What Is a Suspicious Activity Report?, supra note 117.
120. Id. Note that this Article focuses only on U.S. regulatory efforts, although the UK has been
increasingly focused on SAR reporting, culminating in a record-breaking number of reports filed in
March of 2018. Samuel Rubenfeld, U.K. Receives Record Number of Suspicious-Activity Reports,
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 10, 2019, 4:27 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-k-receives-record-numberof-suspicious-activity-reports-11547155674 [https://perma.cc/EX8D-SVR7].
121. What Is a Suspicious Activity Report?, supra note 117.
122. Filing categories have expanded over time, with a modest impact on the nature of reports
filed. For example, in April 2013, FinCEN introduced an electronic SAR filing that includes “elder
financial exploitation” as a category, and such filings tripled in the following years. Suspicious
Activity Report Statistics Database, supra note 10 (follow “Suspicious Activities Report Statistics

2LUND.PRINTER_CORRECTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

Corporate Crime and Punishment

1/9/2022 2:13 PM

313

After the institution receives a report, it must undertake a multistage review
process, which ultimately entails sending it to the bank’s financial
investigators, management, and attorneys.123 Financial institutions are
required to file SARs within thirty days after the detection of suspicious
behavior at their institution. 124 Finalized SARs are sent to one of seven
federal agencies—the FRB, the IRS, the SEC, the OCC, the FDIC, the
NCUA, or the FHFA.125 Under certain circumstances, such as when the SAR
implicates national security, the SAR may be sent to a fusion center that
makes the information available to state and federal agencies that may be
interested in acting.126
There have been a few important changes in SAR filing requirements in
the past few decades. Most importantly, in 2002, the USA Patriot Act made
SAR reporting requirements mandatory for broker-dealers who suspect any
violation of law or regulation (including state law), therefore subjecting
broker-dealers to broader requirements than those of financial institutions.127
Immediately following the enactment of the Patriot Act, there was a spike in
SAR filing, even by banks who were subject to the same requirements as
before (an earlier analysis of SARs shows that the spike eventually tapered
off around 2010, just before our analysis begins).128 A former Treasury
official speculated that the acceleration in filing may have been the result of
financial institution concern about reputational risk after 9/11.129 Since 2002,
however, SAR reporting requirements have been relatively stable.130
We secured all available SAR enforcement data from the U.S. Treasury
FinCEN.131 The SAR data comprise both business-related and individual
Database” hyperlink; then select “Filing Trend Data”; then select “Other”). For this reason, we focus
only on filing categories that have been available since the beginning of our sample period.
123. What Is a Suspicious Activity Report?, supra note 117.
124. Id.
125. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-582, BANK SECRECY ACT: AGENCIES AND
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS SHARE INFORMATION BUT METRICS AND FEEDBACK NOT REGULARLY
PROVIDED 1–2, 3 n.6 (2019).
126. What Is a Suspicious Activity Report?, supra note 117.
127. Bruce G. Leto & Bibb L. Strench, Anti-Money Laundering Initiatives Under the USA
Patriot Act, FINDLAW, https://corporate.findlaw.com/litigation-disputes/anti-money-launderinginitiatives-under-the-usa-patriot-act.html [https://perma.cc/8TPF-QPEK] (Mar. 26, 2008).
128. Aaron Klein & Kristofer Readling, Acceleration in Suspicious Activity Reporting Warrants
Another Look, BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR. (Sept. 15, 2015), https://bipartisanpolicy.org/blog
/acceleration-in-suspicious-activity-reporting-warrants-another-look/
[https://perma.cc/8P6FX9A8]; FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, THE SAR ACTIVITY REVIEW – BY THE NUMBERS 11 (2013)
[hereinafter SAR ACTIVITY REVIEW], https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/sar_report/sar_by
_numb_18.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z2AU-ZSP5].
129. JUAN C. ZARATE, TREASURY’S WAR: THE UNLEASHING OF A NEW ERA OF FINANCIAL
WARFARE 146–47 (2013).
130. Klein & Readling, supra note 128.
131. Before 2012, SAR reports are not available electronically, and so we were not able to
secure data before this date.
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suspicious activity. To proxy for financial-institution crime (rather than
individual crimes that could not be attributed to the entity under respondeat
superior), we isolate SARs where suspects are institutional insiders
(employees, directors, agents, officers, and owning or controlling
shareholders).132 The underlying data are reported monthly and exhibit a high
degree of volatility; to aid with data visualization and interpretation, we
perform one-sided winsorizing at the 90% level and take a twelve-month
moving average of the series.133
Figure 5 reveals an increase in SARs filed across all agencies studied,
which suggests an increase in crimes committed by bank insiders. We
acknowledge that there is not a one-for-one relationship between SARs and
underlying financial crime; however, we think that this data is a better proxy
for violations than Bank Secrecy Act enforcement data. As discussed,
measures of criminal enforcement—such as arrests and prosecutions—are
dependent on factors like the ability to detect criminal behavior, the
availability of admissible evidence, and agency resources. By contrast, bank
employees are required to file SARs whenever they suspect that malfeasant
behavior is occurring, and therefore, the data collected is not subject to the
same endogeneity concern. Thus, while SARs may overstate the amount of
crime (i.e., contain false positives), we doubt that they systematically and
directionally err in reflecting aggregate financial crime trends.

132. This measure may leave us with reports involving individual crime, rather than corporate
crime, in our dataset; for example, if a bank employee engaged in insider trading to benefit herself,
rather than the bank, this misconduct could not be attributed to the entity under respondeat superior.
At the same time, we recognize that slicing the data in this way excludes some corporate criminal
activity that we would like to study; for example, money laundering or bribes paid by corporate
actors would not be captured in our dataset. If the government were able to provide more
information about the content of the SAR filings, we could obtain clearer and more comprehensive
results.
133. Winsorizing the series excludes large outliers from the analysis, which can obfuscate
trends. The use of a moving average also helps smooth the data series, as we analyze the
observations by taking rolling means of twelve-month subsets of the full data series.
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Figure 5: SAR Counts by Agency
OCC
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It is important to note that SAR filings are not exogenous to the
enforcement environment. Earlier data highlight this reality directly: the 2001
Patriot Act did not change the reporting requirements for banks but instead
expanded them to other entities.134 Yet, even for banks, there was a
substantial uptick in SAR reporting. This uptick may have resulted from
increased concern about bank reputation, or increased SAR filing
enforcement by regulators. The uptick in reporting that we observe
necessarily conflates both changes in the level of criminal behavior and in the
reporting of that behavior by financial institutions.
Two helpful facts minimize this endogeneity concern. First, unlike the
lax enforcement of the early 2000s, FinCEN took SAR filing seriously during
the entire period of our sample. Before 2005, FinCEN had not consistently
pursued enforcement actions for the failure to file SARs; that changed in
2005 after the agency prosecuted Riggs Bank criminally for the willful failure
to file SARs, ultimately securing a $16 million fine and five years of criminal
probation for the bank.135 Since that time, the agency has regularly brought
enforcement actions against banks that fail to file SARs.136
Second, although it is true that there has been a level shift upward in
SAR reporting across agencies, it is not the case that these patterns are
identical. Even within an agency, trends in SAR filings differ across
categories. In 2012, mortgage loan fraud reported by depository institutions
decreased by 29 percent—after having risen each year since 1996.137 In that
same year, banks saw increases in 12 of the 21 other suspicious activity
categories.138 This volatility suggests that something other than an increased
willingness to report is driving our results.

134. See 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2) (defining “financial institution” broadly to include not only
banks, but also credit unions, thrift institutions, loan companies, travel agencies, businesses engaged
in real estate transactions, and more).
135. Pelak, supra note 115.
136. Id.; see Alan M. Wolper & Frances Floriano Goins, SEC Civil Penalty Against Charles
Schwab Reflects New Trend in Enforcement of SAR Requirements, LEXOLOGY (Aug. 13, 2018),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=350d2cd9-e2c4-47b8-b091-c25998e1b8fb
[https://perma.cc/26PG-SH6Y] (describing the SEC’s shift in pursuing financial institutions that fail
to file SARs); David S. Cohen, Franca Harris Gutierrez, Sharon Cohen Levin, Ronald I. Meltzer,
Jeremy Dresner, David M. Horn, Zachary Goldman, Michael Romais & Semira Nikou, Anti-Money
Laundering and Sanctions: Trends and Developments Emerging Under the Trump Administration,
WILMERHALE 1 (July 25, 2019), https://www.wilmerhale.com/-/media/5be3841edb2948
e0ba8d16bacd2d1a5a.pdf [https://perma.cc/3KJ4-T6FB] (“[T]he story of the Obama and Trump
Administrations on AML and sanctions is one of general continuity.”).
137. SAR ACTIVITY REVIEW, supra note 128, at 5.
138. Id. at 5–6. It is again possible that the increase in enforcement that prompts extra SARs to
be filed differs within each category. This seems less plausible, and certainly, in the immediate
aftermath of the crisis, it is hard to imagine a category where enforcement would be higher than for
mortgage loan fraud at banks.

2LUND.PRINTER_CORRECTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

Corporate Crime and Punishment

1/9/2022 2:13 PM

317

A related concern is that our results may be driven by heightened
regulatory scrutiny of bank compliance following the financial crisis, which
caused banks to dramatically expand compliance programs and rendered
employees much more sensitive to the risk of enforcement. This regulatory
scrutiny came from multiple directions. For example, the DOJ began
pursuing banks and securing record-breaking fines in the immediate
aftermath of the crisis, as discussed in Part I. In addition, bank compliance
failures came under a spotlight from the OCC, the FRB, and the New York
Department of Financial Services, which was created only in 2011. These
agencies supplemented FinCEN’s efforts by penalizing banks that failed to
adopt effective anti-money laundering controls.139 In addition to increased
regulatory scrutiny, banks were subject to a host of new regulations that
required them to dramatically expand their compliance programs. And we
recognize that the combination of heightened scrutiny, as well as larger and
more sophisticated compliance programs, could lead to an increase in
reporting unrelated to any underlying crime. Regarding compliance,
however, the largest increases in bank spending on compliance occurred in
the immediate aftermath of Dodd–Frank—from 2009 to 2012.140 If the
increase in reporting was solely caused by increased resources spent on
compliance, we would expect to see a spike in reports from 2009 to 2012
(and possibly in the years that followed) and then a levelling off. This is not
what our data shows.
However, it is entirely possible that SAR reporting increased because
employees rightly perceived that bank regulatory scrutiny was on the rise and
would continue in the wake of the financial crisis, leading to excessive
cautiousness. But a few facts counsel against interpreting employee
cautiousness and regulatory scrutiny as the sole cause of the increase we see.
For one, we do not see an immediate increase in the wake of the crisis, when
bank regulatory scrutiny was at its highest point. This may be because SAR
filing had increased dramatically in the wake of 9/11 and remained at high
levels. It is likely, therefore, that banks were already filing a large number of
SARs well before the financial crisis, meaning that we could expect to see
less of an impact from this next wave of bank scrutiny. In addition, there is
ample variation in the data following the financial crisis, and the SAR counts
begin their uptick at different periods for different agencies—the SEC data
139. For a prominent example, see Brian N. Kearney, Standard Chartered Bank Enters
Combined $1 Billion+ Settlement with U.S. and U.K. Authorities over Iranian Financial
Transactions, BALLARD SPAHR: MONEY LAUNDERING WATCH (Apr. 17, 2019), https://
www.moneylaunderingnews.com/2019/04/standard-chartered-bank-enters-combined-1-billionsettlement-with-u-s-and-u-k-authorities-over-iranian-financial-transactions/
[https://perma.cc/
QH8B-SNAJ].
140. See Thomas L. Hogan & Scott Burns, Has Dodd–Frank Affected Bank Expenses?, 55 J.
REGUL. ECON. 214, 216–19, 223, 234 (2019) (showing that compliance expenses at both small and
large banks increased in the Dodd–Frank period of 2009–2012).
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begins to rise in 2014, while the FRB shows a steep increase in 2017, and the
OCC data shows an increase in 2012. This variation suggests that the data is
picking up on something other than employee sensitivity to regulatory
scrutiny, which began in earnest in the immediate wake of the financial crisis.
In sum, although we recognize that our data likely overstate the level of
criminal misconduct at banks, we do not believe that the rise in SARs is solely
explained by an increase in resources spent on compliance, nor by concerns
about the increased risk of regulatory enforcement; instead, we think it
suggests that financial institution crime, and Bank Secrecy Act violations in
particular, are trending upward.
B.

CFPB Consumer Complaint Database
Under Dodd–Frank, the CFPB is required to maintain a consumer
complaint database that allows consumers to submit complaints about unfair,
deceptive, or abusive acts or practices by financial services companies.141
These complaints give the agency “insights into problems people are
experiencing in the marketplace and help [it] regulate consumer financial
products and services under existing federal consumer financial laws, enforce
those laws judiciously, and educate and empower consumers to make
informed financial decisions.”142 The CFPB also intends that the database
will be used by researchers to identify harmful business practices that might
harm consumers.143 The CFPB has accepted complaints regarding credit
cards since its first day of operations in July 2011, and it has since expanded
to several categories: mortgages, bank accounts and services, private student
loans, vehicle loans, other consumer loans, credit reporting complaints, and
money transfers.144
After receiving a consumer complaint, the agency confirms that the
consumer is actually a client of the financial institution in question, that the
complaint has not been filed already, and that the complaint was submitted
by the consumer. However, the agency does not take steps to verify whether
the complaint has merit. Complaints are forwarded to the appropriate

141. Consumer Complaint Database, supra note 10.
142. Consumer Complaint Entry, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, https://
www.consumerfinance.gov/complaint/ [https://perma.cc/Q7VK-UMFH].
143. Richard Cordray, Dir. of the Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Prepared Remarks of Director
Richard Cordray at the Consumer Response Field Hearing (Mar. 28, 2013), https://
www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/prepared-remarks-of-director-richard-cordray-atthe-consumer-response-field-hearing/ [https://perma.cc/UCN5-AQM5]; Ian Ayres, Jeff Lingwall &
Sonia Steinway, Skeletons in the Database: An Early Analysis of the CFPB’s Consumer
Complaints, 19 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 343, 347–52 (2014).
144. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ [https://perma.cc/
6FN3-QVHG].
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company and/or regulatory agency,145 and the company has an opportunity
to respond.146
In Figure 6, we show the number of complaints by product type from
January 2015 to July 2019.147 These graphs reveal an upward trend in
complaints by each product type, with the exception of mortgages.
Figure 6: CFPB Complaints by Product Type
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145. Note that consumer rights law is enormously complex and subject to enforcement at the
state and federal level. At the federal level, consumers have two agencies charged with protecting
their interests—the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection and the CFPB. See id. (stating that the
CFPB “makes sure banks, lenders and other financial companies treat you fairly”); Bureau of
Consumer Protection, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/bureaus-offices
/bureau-consumer-protection [https://perma.cc/B5P9-PM4T] (“The FTC’s Bureau of Consumer
Protection stops unfair, deceptive and fraudulent business practices by collecting reports from
consumers and conducting investigations, suing companies and people that break the law,
developing rules to maintain a fair marketplace, and educating consumers and businesses about their
rights and responsibilities.”). Although the agencies cannot bring criminal charges themselves, they
can refer criminal matters to the DOJ and often coordinate investigations with the DOJ.
146. Ayres, Lingwall & Steinway, supra note 143, at 357. The company must respond within
15 days to be considered “timely.” Id.
147. Again, to aid in visualization and interpretation, we performed one-sided winsorizing of
the data at the 90% threshold level. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
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What to make of these results? CFPB complaints are distinct from SAR
filings in an important way: they are voluntary reports made by consumers
who believe themselves to be victims of crimes and other misconduct, rather
than mandatory reports by bank employees. Thus, the endogeneity concern
detailed above—that the increase in SAR reporting reflects changes in the
enforcement regime—is irrelevant in this context. Instead, with respect to the
CFPB database, a competing explanation for the uptick in consumer
complaints is that the increase in reporting is driven by an increase in
consumers’ likelihood of reporting and not a change in the underlying level
of malfeasance. Although there certainly is some learning at play in the data,
as evidenced by the large spike in the first two months of our dataset, we
would expect uniform increases in complaint counts across all product types
if this were the only operative effect. The steady decrease in mortgage
complaints after 2016 suggests that the database may be picking up on
something else.
Why do we observe a decrease in mortgage complaints? Several
possibilities exist. The fall in mortgage complaints is consistent with
increased scrutiny from the federal government about mortgage practices in
the years following the financial crisis, as new regulations and regulatory
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oversight helped eliminate abusive practices.148 This is not the only possible
explanation—it could be attributable to a fall in mortgage delinquencies, for
example149—but in any event, we think that it helps debunk the view that the
increase in other types of complaints is solely attributable to an increase in
consumer familiarity with the consumer complaint resource.
In related work, Kaveh Bastani, Hamed Namavari, and Jeffrey Shaffer
study in greater detail the narratives that consumers report to the CFPB when
they file complaints.150 They too document interesting shifts in topic
popularity over time, which experienced substantial volatility over their yearlong sample.151 It is hard to see how shifts in consumers’ ease of reporting
could drive these results. In fact, the authors suggest that regulators should
do more to use the CFPB data to aid enforcement efforts, such as by applying
machine-learning techniques to consumer complaints to identify problems in
consumer financial markets more quickly.
There is an additional concern that consumer reports are not appropriate
proxies for financial institution misconduct because consumers can report
annoyances (e.g., “the late fee charged by my credit card company is high”)
alongside crimes (e.g., “I was defrauded”). Indeed, the database does not
distinguish between “major” and “minor” complaints, nor does it verify the
accuracy of each complaint lodged before making it publicly available.152
However, analysis of the CFPB complaints data suggests that a nontrivial
amount of these complaints tracks misbehavior. Although the majority of
complaints are closed by companies with an explanation, 17% are closed with
some type of relief, including “monetary relief” or “non-monetary relief,” the

148. See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text.
149. See Mortgages 90 Days or More Delinquent, supra note 14 (illustrating a decline in
mortgage delinquencies from January 2008 to December 2020).
150. Kaveh Bastani, Hamed Namavari & Jeffrey Shaffer, Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) for
Topic Modeling of the CFPB Consumer Complaints, 127 EXPERT SYS. WITH APPLICATIONS 256
(2019).
151. Id. at 264–65.
152. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, DOCKET NO. CFPB-2012-0023, NOTICE OF FINAL
POLICY STATEMENT: DISCLOSURE OF CONSUMER COMPLAINT DATA (2013). Industry lobbyists
tried (and failed) to convince the CFPB to end the publication of the database on this basis, arguing
that “[f]or too long, the bureau’s unverified compliant [sic] database has functioned to paint a picture
of guilt through government press releases and statements, despite the CFPB reporting the
overwhelming majority of complaints being self-corrected by banks.” Jacob Passy, In a Blow to
Financial-Services Industry, the CFPB Will Keep Consumer Complaints Database Public,
MARKETWATCH (Sept. 22, 2019, 9:27 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/in-a-blow-tofinancial-services-industry-the-cfpb-will-keep-consumer-complaints-database-public-2019-09-18
[https://perma.cc/8CLU-GGLH] (quoting the Consumer Bankers Association).
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latter of which includes “changing account terms, correcting submissions to
a credit bureau, or coming up with a foreclosure alternative.”153
Figure 7: CFPB Resolved Complaints by Resolution Type (2014–2019)
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In addition, we studied time trends for consumer complaints in each of
these four categories. If the underlying uptick in consumer complaints is
driven by an increase in grievances rather than corporate malfeasance, we
would expect to see an increase in reports closed without relief or closed with
explanation. We would not necessarily expect to see an increase in instances
of misconduct that firms have difficulty responding to, nor would we expect
to see increases in misconduct that require monetary relief. Instead, as Figure
8 reveals, we see complaints trend upward in each category. And although
the vast majority of cases are closed with explanation or with non-monetary
relief, a substantial portion falls into the more severe categories.

153. Press Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, CFPB Launches Consumer Complaint
Database (June 19, 2012), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/consumerfinancial-protection-bureau-launches-consumer-complaint-database/
[https://perma.cc/VEF9MWMU]. Note that 98% of complaints receive a timely response from the financial service
provider. Consumer Complaint Database, supra note 10.
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Figure 8: CFPB Complaints by Disposition
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As a final check, we manually classify complaints into three categories:
petty, mild, and severe. We determine severity by studying the “issue” and
“sub-issue” categorizations that the CFPB provides.154 Our assessment of

154. Id. There are eighty-one issue categories, with the most common between 2018 and 2021
being: “Incorrect information on your report” (357,916 complaints), “Problem with a credit
reporting company’s investigation into an existing problem” (126,675 complaints), “Attempts to
collect debt not owed” (73,393 complaints), “Managing an account” (42,693 complaints), and
“Improper use of your report” (41,385). Id. All issue categories are available on the CFPB’s
Consumer Complaint Database. Id. Each category has sub-levels that we also rely on for
categorization (e.g., for “Incorrect information on your report,” these sub-levels include:
“Information belongs to someone else,” “Account status incorrect,” “Account information
incorrect,” “Personal information incorrect,” “Public record information inaccurate,” “Old
information reappears or never goes away,” “Information is missing that should be on the report,”
“Information is incorrect,” and “Information that should be on the report is missing”). Id. As an
example of what our categorization process entails, consider the following examples. “Petty”
complaints include consumers who take issue with receiving calls before 8 am and after 9 pm or
being charged fees for account closure. “Moderate” complaints include instances where consumers
report billing disputes with financial services providers and the use of high-pressure sales tactics.
“Severe” complaints include allegations that firms impersonated law enforcement or government
officials, or made fraudulent loans.
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severity is based on two factors: (1) assuming the allegations are true, how
serious is the underlying corporate misconduct, and (2) how likely is it that
the allegations are true? There is inherently ample discretion in this manual
categorization exercise. Since we are focused on measuring trends in
corporate criminality, we are conservative and tend to exclude categories of
complaints where the possibility of underlying criminal activity is uncertain.
As Figure 9 reveals, we observe that across the “non-petty” consumer
categories (“moderate” and “severe” on our scale), there is a substantial
uptick in both moderate and severe cases. This data supports the notion that
there has been an uptick in consumer reports of troubling corporate
misconduct, rather than simply petty grievances.
Figure 9: Trends in Non-Petty Consumer Complaints
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Further support for the view that our data are picking up on overall rates
of illegal behavior comes from analyzing the raw student loan data shown in
Figure 10. In late February 2016, CFPB updated its complaint form to capture
information about federal student loan servicing, in addition to private
student loan servicing.155 That precipitated an immediate increase in the
count of student loan complaints, suggesting that learning effects flow
through relatively quickly. The large spike in early 2017, on the other hand,
reflects the criminal behavior underlying the CFPB’s major enforcement
action against Navient, the largest student loan company in the United States,
alleging illegal practices that thwarted borrowers’ ability to make accelerated

155. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, MIDYEAR UPDATE ON STUDENT LOAN COMPLAINTS:
INCOME-DRIVEN REPAYMENT PLAN APPLICATION ISSUES 2 (2016), https://files
.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201608_cfpb_StudentLoanOmbudsmanMidYearReport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4W4P-L923].
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repayments.156 Again, the spike is immediate and short-lived. Taken together,
these pieces of evidence suggest that learning about the existence of the
consumer complaint database is unlikely to be the sole driver of increased
traffic across the database’s many categories of financial products. To the
extent that learning—about the database as a resource or about potential
criminal behavior that a customer has fallen victim to—drives the decision to
seek recourse, this occurs immediately.
Figure 10: Raw CFPB Complaints for the Student Loan Category
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However, we recognize that complaints of misconduct do not correlate
perfectly with complaints involving crime. Nonetheless, the more severe the
misbehavior, the more comfortable we are suggesting that the uptick in
misconduct we observe correlates with an uptick in crime. Further, anecdotal
evidence supports the notion that there is a relationship between consumer
use of the complaint database and financial crime. Between October 2016
and December 2016, credit card complaints by customers of Wells Fargo

156. Press Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, CFPB Sues Nation’s Largest Student Loan
Company Navient for Failing Borrowers at Every Stage of Repayment (Jan. 18, 2017), https://
www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-sues-nations-largest-student-loan-companynavient-failing-borrowers-every-stage-repayment/ [https://perma.cc/DK6T-C3ZK]. The agency
alleged that the company had violated the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act. Id.
Although these were all civil allegations, it would have been possible for the federal government
(as well as state agencies) to pursue criminal charges for the student loan provider’s allegedly
deceptive, abusive, and fraudulent practices.
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increased by nearly one hundred percent relative to the same period the year
prior, an increase contemporaneous with the bank’s fake accounts scandal.157
Therefore, while we do not believe that there is a one-to-one correlation
between the number of complaints filed and aggregate crime levels, we do
believe that consumer complaints can serve as a useful proxy for overall
misconduct committed by consumer-facing financial institutions.158
In sum, two distinct proxies for financial institution misconduct—
consumer complaints to the CFPB and SAR reports filed by banks
themselves—document an increase in complaints that are indicative of crime
by financial institutions. This evidence suggests that the federal enforcement
regime, which in the past decade has prioritized entity liability and fines over
individual liability, may not be adequately deterring financial crime.
C.

SEC Whistleblower Tips

In addition to creating the CFPB, Dodd–Frank amended the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934 to create Section 21F, which directs the SEC to
make monetary awards available to individuals who provide original
information that leads to successful enforcement actions against perpetrators
of financial fraud.159 To implement this program, the SEC created the Office
of the Whistleblower.160 The whistleblower program went into effect in 2011,
and as Figure 11 reveals, the number of tips received has increased in nearly
every year since the program’s inception.161 Most of these tips involve
157. Ashlee Kieler, Complaints About Student Loan Servicing Increased 429% in Past Year,
CONSUMER REPORTS: CONSUMERIST, https://www.consumerreports.org/consumerist/complaintsabout-student-loan-servicing-increased-429-in-past-year/ [https://perma.cc/SF6Q-G3UZ] (Mar. 28,
2017).
158. Federal law confers criminal jurisdiction over a variety of consumer financial protection
matters; however, the CFPB lacks authority to bring criminal actions and is required to make
criminal referrals to the Attorney General: “If the [CFPB] obtains evidence that any person,
domestic or foreign, has engaged in conduct that may constitute a violation of Federal criminal law,
the [CFPB] shall transmit such evidence to the Attorney General of the United States, who may
institute criminal proceedings under appropriate law.” 12 U.S.C. § 5566. In furtherance of this goal,
the DOJ and the CFPB have entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that details their
partnership. See Memorandum of Understanding Between the Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau and the
U.S. Dep’t of Just. Regarding Fair Lending Coordination (Dec. 6, 2012), http://
files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201212_cfpb_doj-fair-lending-mou.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MF9WZATK] (detailing the agreement between the CFPB and DOJ); J.H. Jennifer Lee & John R. Marti,
Consumer Protection, the CFPB, and Prison: How Jail Sentences Arose Out of Civil Consumer
Financial Protection Matters, ANTITRUST, Summer 2017, at 20, 21, https://www.dorsey.com/~
/media/Files/Uploads/Images/Smmr17LeeC [https://perma.cc/6ZUQ-HRHS] (describing the
framework of the MoU, which “addresses information sharing, joint investigations and
coordination, and referrals and notifications between the agencies”).
159. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6; WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM, supra note 11, at 6.
160. Office of the Whistleblower, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/
whistleblower [https://perma.cc/KP7N-GLS5].
161. The fact that the program began in 2011 is likely why the number of tips was so much
lower in that year than other years.
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allegations about improper corporate disclosures and financial statements,
offering fraud, or market manipulation.162 Whistleblowers have also helped
the SEC bring enforcement cases “involving an array of securities violations,
including offering frauds, such as Ponzi or Ponzi-like schemes, false or
misleading statements in a company’s offering memoranda or marketing
materials, false pricing information, accounting violations, internal controls
violations, and Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) violations, among
other types of corporate misconduct.”163
Figure 11: SEC Whistleblower Tips Over Time
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Whistleblower tips may be filed whenever individuals observe
violations of the law, and therefore, the more violations, the more tips we
would expect to see. However, many factors could confound the results. As
with the CFPB data, the increase could be due to changes in reporting
practices, and specifically, an increase in reporting due to a heightened
awareness of the program and the awards that successful whistleblowers can
reap. Whistleblowers can receive 10% to 30% of any recovery in excess of
$1 million, and headlines of multimillion dollar victories could encourage
reticent employees to come forward (indeed, this is the goal of the
program).164 In addition, law firms anxious to capitalize on the bounties have
begun to advise whistleblowers to file complaints in the past few years. This
increased awareness of potential awards could contribute to the increase that
we observe.

162. WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM, supra note 11, at 23.
163. Id. at 18.
164. 15 U.S.C § 78u–6; PROGRAM, supra note 11, at 6.
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Another confounding factor is the SEC’s effort to remove barriers to
whistleblowing imposed by employers. For example, in 2015, the SEC began
pursuing companies that used confidentiality agreements in employee
contracts to discourage employees from filing whistleblower complaints. In
one such case, an employee contract required departing employees to forfeit
their severance if they filed a complaint with the SEC.165 The SEC has since
secured cease-and-desist orders and financial penalties against several
companies with such language in their employee contracts, which caused law
firms to advise companies with similar language to eliminate it. 166 The
removal of barriers to whistleblowing could be a partial cause of the increase
that we observe. We doubt, however, that it would be the sole cause—
lawyers had been advising whistleblowers long before the SEC enforcement
actions that such clauses were not enforceable.167
As in the previous two datasets, it is likely that the tips we record include
false positives. Indeed, in light of the massive awards that are possible, the
incentive to file an unsubstantiated whistleblower tip might be quite high.168
However, the SEC does put some barriers in the way of frivolous tips—to be
eligible for the SEC’s anti-retaliation protection, tippees must have a
“reasonable belief” that the action they are reporting reveals a legal
violation.169 In addition, anonymous tips are ineligible for awards (unless the
anonymous tippee works with an attorney).170 More than that, there are many
negative consequences for employees who report workplace misconduct,
such as isolation at work and job loss. Indeed, most whistleblowers go to
great lengths to report and attempt to resolve wrongdoing internally to avoid
the negative repercussions that come from whistleblowing.171 Therefore, we

165. KEEPING CURRENT: SEC Enforcement Expands Scope of Prohibited Provisions in
Employment-Related Agreements, AM. BAR ASS’N: BUS. L. TODAY (Oct. 20, 2016), https://
www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2016/10/keeping_current/
[https://
perma.cc/GVB8-GH4M].
166. Id.
167. Richard Moberly, Jordan A. Thomas & Jason Zuckerman, De Facto Gag Clauses: The
Legality of Employment Agreements That Undermine Dodd–Frank’s Whistleblower Provisions, 30
ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 87, 89 (2014).
168. See, e.g., Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, Noise Reduction: The Screening Value of
Qui Tam, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1169, 1175 (2014) (noting that a concern in the Dodd–Frank
whistleblower program is the over-provision of tips because of the absence of a mechanism that
imposes some cost on whistleblowers).
169. 17 C.F.R § 240.21F-2(b)(1) (2020); Lisa M. Noler, Pamela L. Johnston & Bryan B. House,
FOLEY & LARDNER LLP, A REVIEW OF RECENT WHISTLEBLOWER DEVELOPMENTS (Oct. 29,
2019), https://www.foley.com/en/insights/publications/2019/10/a-review-of-recent-whistleblowerdevelopments [https://perma.cc/64GA-S92T].
170. 15 U.S.C § 78u–6(d)(2).
171. Roomy Khan, Whistleblower: Warrior, Saboteur or Snitch?, FORBES (July 5, 2018,
1:03 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/roomykhan/2018/07/05/whistleblower-warrior-saboteuror-snitch/#676fa9b36362 [https://perma.cc/J5JR-HRG4].
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believe that these features of the enforcement environment somewhat check
the rate of false positives.
***
To summarize, each of our proxies indicates that reported misconduct
has risen in the past decade. We recognize that reported misconduct does not
correlate perfectly with actual misconduct: regarding whistleblower tips and
SAR reports, employees may underreport known criminal behavior in order
to avoid enforcement agencies’ attention. By contrast, disgruntled employees
may report petty grievances. With respect to consumer complaints, much of
what is reported falls under the category of grievances (e.g., consumers are
struggling to pay their mortgage, or financial institutions are spamming with
repeated advertising calls) rather than misconduct (e.g., credit reporting
companies misusing consumer data or fraudulently opening accounts).
Therefore, we do not suggest that these data provide an accurate
measurement of overall crime rates; indeed, we find it likely that other factors
affect the upward trends that we observe.
In particular, these data are necessarily responsive to the enforcement
regime that governs these filings. For SAR data, for example, it is possible
that we are capturing an increase in reporting because institutions are more
carefully policed after the financial crisis of 2008. Likewise, whistleblowers
may be responding to increased financial incentives for reporting criminal
behavior, rather than any uptick in criminality. We understand there are
reasons to believe that our results conflate levels of crime with an increase in
incentives for reporting bad behavior, but we suspect that our results are at
least partially explained by an uptick in underlying levels of criminality.
Importantly, we observe volatility in each of our data series—levels of
malfeasance ebb and flow over time in a way that is inconsistent with a onetime shock to reporting incentives. In sum, although we do not claim to
provide a measure of overall crime rates, we do believe that in the aggregate,
the data indicate that corporate crime has been trending upward over our
sample period.
The evidence that crime has increased in the past eight years is
consistent with what theory predicts would happen in response to the changes
in enforcement that we observe: fines have risen, but the overall number of
prosecutions and individual penalties have fallen. These trends are even
starker when we focus in on financial institutions. In the wake of the financial
crisis, only one guilty executive was sent to jail, and very few employees
were prosecuted.172 In addition, enforcement against institutions was
sporadic, and certain crimes—including violations of the Bank Secrecy
Act—were ignored altogether. In light of these trends, our results are not
172. Eisinger, supra note 61.
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surprising. Criminals weigh the individual benefits of crime against the costs
of bad behavior. Once the costs of offending are lowered, the benefits are
more likely to outweigh them.
Of course, the DOJ did secure a handful of large fines against corporate
criminals during the period we studied. Were these fines large enough to
make up for sporadic enforcement and the lack of individual penalties? The
next subpart describes our study of corporate criminal recidivism and the
evidence that supports our interpretation that even these record-breaking
fines were still too low to deter future instances of misconduct.
D.

Recidivism and Fines

To study corporate recidivism, we relied on public company
enforcement data from Brandon Garrett. Garrett has studied recidivism by
financial institutions, noting that federal prosecutors repeatedly settle
criminal cases with the same banks over a short period. These financial
institution recidivists include AIG (which was the subject of enforcement
proceedings in 2004 and again in 2006), Barclays (2010, 2012, and 2015),
Credit Suisse (2009 and 2014), HSBC (2001 and 2012), J.P. Morgan (2011,
2014, and 2015), Lloyds (2009 and 2014), the Royal Bank of Scotland (twice
in 2013 and again in 2015), UBS (2009, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2015), and
Wachovia (2010 and 2011).173 He suggests that this evidence of recidivism
casts doubt on whether prosecutors take financial institution misconduct
seriously and whether corporate penalties are sufficiently deterring corporate
actors from engaging in crime.174
Anecdotal evidence provides a further glimpse into the scope of the
recidivism problem. To take just one example, in 2012 HSBC admitted to
helping launder money for South American drug cartels. It received a record
$1.9 billion fine and secured an agreement with prosecutors that would defer
criminal sanctions.175 The year after that agreement expired, HSBC entered
into another do-not-prosecute agreement with prosecutors, this time for fraud
in the foreign exchange market.176 As part of this agreement, HSBC paid
$110 million dollars, and no individuals were charged.177 And in 2019, before
this second agreement expired, the bank entered into yet a third agreement

173. Garrett, Bank Prosecutions, supra note 3, at 42.
174. Id. (“One wonders how seriously prosecutors take recidivism among major financial
institutions and how effective prosecutions have been in changing any underlying culture of lawbreaking.”).
175. See, e.g., Aaron Elstein, Third Time’s a Charm? HSBC Enters into Yet Another
Deferred Prosecution Agreement, CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS. (Dec. 11, 2019, 4:00 PM), https://
www.crainsnewyork.com/markets/third-times-charm-hsbc-enters-yet-another-deferredprosecution-agreement [https://perma.cc/B8S2-MR3E].
176. Id.
177. Id.
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deferring charges for helping American clients evade taxes.178 No individuals
were charged, and the bank again paid a fine—this time of $192 million. 179
In at least this case, the do-not-prosecute agreements and accompanying
penalties did not appear to deter future misdeeds. As Brandon Garrett put it
in his article studying bank recidivism: “They are recidivists, but they do not
receive harsher penalties despite their growing criminal records. . . .
Individual criminal defendants are not so lucky.”180
We expand on Garrett’s inquiry more systematically by studying
recidivism by all publicly traded corporations over the last two decades,
focusing on the relative size of the penalty for recidivist firms versus onetime offenders.181 We define a corporate recidivist to be a public company
that was prosecuted more than once between 2001 and 2018. We begin with
a list of 384 corporate prosecutions naming publicly traded corporate
defendants. We identify any fines paid by the corporations, including
restitution, forfeiture, disgorgement of profits, and other monetary penalties
and payments to enforcers in parallel civil suits. We normalize fines by three
measures of firm size—assets, revenue, and employee headcount—each of
which is available from Compustat. We normalize this variable because we
believe that fine size should scale with firm size, although we recognize that
this will not always be the case. In general, larger firms have the ability to
commit crimes that cause greater social harm because of their larger size and
scale of operations. Consider the Volkswagen cheating scandal as an
example. In that case, the company had sold millions of cars across the globe
that misled regulators about their environmental emissions. 182 Quite
obviously, a similar violation committed by a smaller company without
global reach would have a less socially harmful impact simply by virtue of
the smaller scale of its operations. In addition, the larger the company, the
higher the costs of compliance, indicating that a larger fine would be
necessary to induce a large company to spend adequate resources to root out
socially harmful behavior across the organization. Again, this generalization
is not necessarily true in all circumstances—a small company could in theory

178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Garrett, Declining Corporate Prosecutions, supra note 32, at 125.
181. We rely on the Garrett dataset as a starting point and build on it to address some limitations.
In particular, we conduct our analysis of recidivists at the parent company level, which required us
to link subsidiaries of the same parent company manually. On occasion, the dataset contains
duplicates of the same prosecution, for example, because additional individual charges are resolved
close in time to, but not on the same day as, the underlying corporate prosecution. We manually
investigate each entry to be sure we are capturing unique events.
182. See Coral Davenport & Danny Hakim, U.S. Sues Volkswagen in Diesel Emissions Scandal,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/05/business/vw-sued-justicedepartment-emissions-scandal.html?searchResultPosition=17
[https://perma.cc/A5YW-QMC5]
(providing an overview of the Volkswagen cheating scandal).
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commit a crime that is more socially harmful than the crime committed by a
much larger company—but in general, we believe that social harm of crime
should scale with firm size.
Of the 384 prosecutions, we matched defendants from 372 of them to
firms in Compustat. We were also able to match five prosecutions to public
corporations not in Compustat; we pulled assets, revenue, and headcount data
for these firms from SEC filings via EDGAR.183 Where possible, subsidiary
firms were matched to parents, as long as the parent had acquired the
subsidiary at the time of settlement. For international firms, annual assets,
revenue, and headcount data were pulled from Compustat’s Global Daily
database;184 for U.S. listed firms, from Compustat’s North American Daily
database.185 As Compustat reports international data in local currencies, we
converted size data to dollars using end-of-year conversion factors from
FRED’s daily foreign exchange series.186 International firms were queried via
ISIN numbers; U.S. listed firms, via CUSIPs where possible and CIK
numbers otherwise. All dollar figures were converted to 2018 dollars using
the CPI series from FRED.
We maintain three different Boolean measures of procedural toughness.
The first indicates whether an agreement required a corporate monitor; the
second, periodic audits of compliance programs; and the third, either of the
first two. In other words, we ensure that a company is not more likely to be a
recidivist because the enforcement agency has greater knowledge about the
company and its operations as a result of penalties secured in the first
enforcement action. We observe in Table 1 that a recidivist is as likely as a
one-time offender to have a corporate monitor or audit imposed, and in
subsequent offenses, is actually less likely to have either imposed.

183. EDGAR Company Filings: Company and Person Lookup, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
https://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html [https://perma.cc/VJ4B-6E52].
184. WHARTON RSCH. DATA SERVS., https://wrds-www.wharton.upenn.edu/ [https://perma.cc/
BMN8-HH58].
185. Id.
186. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys. (US), U.S./Euro Foreign Exchange Rate, FRED,
FED. RSRV. BANK OF ST. LOUIS, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DEXUSEU [https://perma.cc/
25ZH-UPD8] (updated daily).

2LUND.PRINTER_CORRECTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

1/9/2022 2:13 PM

Corporate Crime and Punishment

333

Table 1: Boolean Measures of Procedural Toughness
Offense
Count

One-Time
Offenders
(N = 221)
Recidivists
(N = 51)
Recidivist
1st Offense
(N = 51)
Recidivist
2nd Offense
(N = 51)
Recidivist
3rd or
Subsequent
(N = 14)

Fraction With:

Difference vs. One-Time Offenders

Monitors

Audits

19.00%

14.03%

Monitors
or Audits
27.15%

Monitors

Audits

Monitors
or Audits

(2.65%)

(2.34%)

(3.00%)

-

-

-

11.02%
(2.79%)
23.5%

9.45%
(2.61%)
9.8%

17.32%
(3.37%)
27.5%

-7.98%
(7.28%)
4.52%

-4.58%
(7.14%)
-4.22%

-9.83%*
(7.57%)
0.3%

(6.00%)

(4.21%)

(6.31%)

(7.67%)

(7.17%)

(7.73%)

3.92%

7.84%

9.80%

-15.08%***

-6.18%

-17.35%***

(2.75%)

(3.80%)

(4.21%)

(6.46%)

(7.00%)

(7.24%)

0.00%

12.00%

12.00%

-19%****

-2.03%

-15.15%

(0.00%)

(6.63%)

(6.63%)

(3.29%)

(12.98%)

(13.02%)

After normalizing fines, we construct a measure of recidivism to gauge
whether the increase in fines operates as a deterrence mechanism. First, we
sorted the resulting public corporation database by unique parent entity and
date. For each firm, we manually cross-referenced prosecutions settled within
one year of each other against filings provided by the Corporate Prosecution
Registry (CPR); if multiple prosecutions in the CPR cited the same
underlying malfeasance, we counted this as a single prosecution and summed
the associated penalties. This procedure reduced the number of prosecutions
from 372 to 348, implicating 272 parent entities. Of these, 221 unique firms
were one-time offenders, and 51 unique firms (or 18.7%) were recidivists.
Table 2 summarizes the fines, data, and characteristics of recidivist and
non-recidivist firms. Recidivists face larger penalties on average ($256
million versus $122 million for non-recidivists), but recidivist firms are also
much larger than non-recidivist firms when measured by assets and revenue,
as well as market capitalization, which is shown in Figures 12 and 13.187

187. Our results are therefore consistent with CLAYPOOL, supra note 34, at 5 (“The biggest
corporations get the most lenience.”).
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Figure 12: Distribution of Non-Recidivist Firms by Market Capitalization

Figure 13: Distribution of Recidivist firms by Market Capitalization at First Offense
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As a share of assets, revenue, and total employees, recidivists in fact
face less stringent penalties (0.22% of assets for recidivists, versus 16.84%
of assets for one-time offenders, or approximately 1/80th the size; 0.55% of
revenue for recidivists, versus 19.28% for one-time offenders, or
approximately 1/35th the size; 0.42% of market capitalization for recidivists,
versus 19.67% for one-time offenders, or approximately 1/40th the size).
Therefore, although big public companies pay large fines, those fines are
much smaller relative to the size of fines paid by smaller public companies
(when normalized to account for their different size). Of course, this could
be because smaller public companies commit more socially harmful crimes
relative to larger institutions. But as mentioned, there are reasons to suspect
that is not the case. First, somewhat mechanically, the ability to perpetuate
harm against one’s customers is a by-product of the size and scope of the
company’s operations. For crime by a consumer-facing financial institution,
the severity of the harm should scale upwards by the number of employees
or customers. For example, if Wells Fargo had just a few customers—rather
than their estimated 70 million 188—then the scope of their criminality with
respect to the fake accounts scandal would have been much more limited.
Further and relatedly, the most socially harmful crimes are less likely to be
perpetuated by small firms, which generally lack the scale and scope to create
systemic harm. For example, a bribe by a small company is surely less likely
to “undermine the integrity and stability of governments and harm our
relations with other countries,” whereas bribes paid by a prominent company
could.189 Likewise, if only small banks had originated fraudulent mortgages
during the crisis, there would not likely have been the same degree of harm
to the global economy.
As with much of the descriptive data that we present, it is impossible to
rule out that smaller firms are simply committing larger crimes. But the more
likely interpretation of the data is that they show an upper bound on corporate
fines—for example, it might not be politically feasible to levy an $81 billion
fine on Volkswagen (or 16% of the company’s assets).190 More importantly,
it might not be legally permissible because fines are often limited by

188. Rey Mashayekhi, Can Anyone Fix Wells Fargo?, FORTUNE (Feb. 3, 2021, 5:30 AM),
https://fortune.com/longform/fixing-wells-fargo-charles-scharf-ceo-regulatory-issues-privacyfake-account-fraud-scandal-covid/ [https://perma.cc/L5N9-MBXS].
189. Statement by President Jimmy Carter, supra note 100.
190. Indeed, the DOJ secured only a $2.8 billion fine in the wake of the company’s emission
scandal. However, this fine was the largest criminal fine ever negotiated between the U.S.
government and an automaker. Paul A. Eisenstein, Volkswagen Slapped with Largest Ever Fine for
Automakers, NBC NEWS (Apr. 21, 2017, 4:33 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/business/autos
/judge-approves-largest-fine-u-s-history-volkswagen-n749406 [https://perma.cc/SSY2-CGHG].
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statute.191 And even if they could secure massive fines, prosecutors may have
little incentive to do so when a smaller fine will garner substantial fame and
attention: for example, Wells Fargo’s $1 billion settlement was celebrated as
the most aggressive bank penalty of the Trump era, despite representing only
0.1% of firm assets.192
Table 3 shows the same data for recidivist public companies by offense
count. As one might expect, dollar fines increase with offense count;
however, fines are more lenient (when measured as a percentage of assets or
revenue) for second and subsequent offenses than for first offenses.193 In
other words, this evidence suggests that prosecutors treat recidivist firms
more leniently than non-recidivists. What explains this behavior? Perhaps
these later crimes are unrelated to the first and the DOJ is levying fines that
scale appropriately with the social cost of the crime. Another possibility is
that criminal enforcement is a repeat game, and the companies get better at
negotiating for leniency the more times that they interact with prosecutors as
defendants. Or, again, perhaps an upper bound exists (at least in the mind of
prosecutors) that restricts the aggregate amount of fines that can be levied on
any one firm.
Table 2: Penalties and Measures of Firm Size for Public Corporations

$121,822,340

Assets
(billions)
$58.195

Revenue
(billions)
$25.960

Market Cap
(billions)
$21.278

(18,943,376)

(13.737)

(4.676)

(2.923)

$256,300,279
(48,166,081)

$587.689
(92.764)

$62.768
(6.715)

$90.338
(8.561)

Penalty Size
One-Time
Offenders
(N = 221)
Recidivists
(N = 51)

191. To take just one example, the FCPA sets the amount of entity-level fines for bribery to be
$2 million for each violation, but states that the maximum fine can be increased to $25 million for
willful violations. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2(g)(1)(A), 78dd-3(e)(1)(A), 78ff(c)(1)(A), 78ff(a);
see also Cary Coglianese, Bounded Evaluation: Cognition, Incoherence, and Regulatory Policy, 54
STAN. L. REV. 1217, 1220 (2002) (noting statutes that impose penalties on regulated actors
“typically provide for maximum penalties that can be imposed”).
192. Renae Merle, U.S. to Fine Wells Fargo $1 Billion – the Most Aggressive Bank Penalty of
the Trump Era, WASH. POST (Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy
/regulators-planning-to-slap-wells-fargo-with-1-billion-fine/2018/04/19/ec1f58c6-4415-11e8ad8f-27a8c409298b_story.html [https://perma.cc/DU2R-HBTP].
193. As a percentage of market capitalization, fines are roughly the same for the first and second
offenses, and smaller for the third.
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51,875

Penalty/
Assets
16.84%

Penalty/
Revenue
19.28%

Penalty/
Market Cap
19.67%

Penalty/
Employee
$11,820

(11.156)

(12.64%)

(12.84%)

(8.01%)

(2,482)

95,835
(7,190)

0.22%
(0.04%)

0.55%
(0.08%)

0.42%
(0.07%)

$3,628
(677)

Employees
One-Time
Offenders
(N = 221)
Recidivists
(N = 51)
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Table 3: Penalties and Measures of Firm Size for Recidivist Public Corporations by
Offense Count
Panel A
Offense
Count
First
(N = 51)
Second
(N = 51)
Third or
Subsequent
(N = 14)

Penalty Size

Assets
(billions)

Revenue
(billions)

Market Cap
(billions)

$222,574,165
(52,872,623)
$224,049,474
(60,103,192)
$390,893,194

$578.783
(157.612)
$524.653
(140.542)
$734.450

$60.498
(10.233)
$57.176
(9.793)
$78.808

$85.674
(14.492)
$82.903
(11.881)
$114.722

(183,575,956)

(196.808)

(18.333)

(20.670)

Panel B
Offense
Count
First
(N = 51)
Second
(N = 51)
Third or
Subsequent
(N = 14)

Employees
93,952
(12,533)
90,641
(11,447)
110,270
(11,966)

Penalty/
Assets
0.28%
(0.08%)
0.18%
(0.04%)
0.14%
(0.07)

Penalty/
Revenue
0.61%
(0.13%)
0.55%
(0.13%)
0.41%
(0.15)

Penalty/
Market Cap
0.42%
(0.09%)
0.46%
(0.12%)
0.35%
(0.13)

Penalty/
Employee
$3,361
(780)
$3,436
(7,441)
$4,567
(2,235)

In sum, our study of public company recidivism indicates that smaller
public companies are subject to more burdensome fines than their larger
public company counterparts, and they are also less likely to offend again.
By contrast, larger public companies are more likely to receive a relatively
small fine, and more likely to offend again, than smaller firms. Indeed, the
largest firms in our sample were most likely to be subject to several
enforcement actions during our sample period. Consistent with our analysis,
Public Citizen reported in 2019 that of the thirty-eight repeat offenders they
were able to identify, thirty-six were on the Forbes 2000 list and three had
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held the top spot as the largest corporation in the world.194 Again, this could
be because large firms have more opportunities to offend (more employees,
more business activity) or have more difficulty policing their ranks. Or
perhaps they are equally likely to offend but are more likely to be pursued by
the DOJ when they do. The latter hypothesis is particularly compelling:
prosecutors garner more fame and attention from prosecutions against large,
well-known companies than they do from prosecutions of smaller companies.
This reality likely explains some of our results, but the fact that relative fines
are so much lower for large firms than smaller firms also suggests that the
first penalty may not serve as a sufficient deterrent.
As additional support for this interpretation, we observe an increase in
recidivism between 2001 and 2018. In particular, as Figure 14 reveals, the
share of crimes committed by recidivist companies jumps from 7% in 2010
to 28% in 2011 and continues to rise after that, hitting a high point of 50% in
2015. This means that a greater share of prosecutions involved companies
that had offended more than once in the immediate aftermath of the financial
crisis. As Table 1 explains, this result is not explained by the presence of a
corporate monitor or audit requirement in the first prosecution. In addition,
although the growth of recidivism in the early years of our sample is not
surprising—in 2002, for example, there were fewer years to commit crimes
and be deemed a recidivist—the shift at the end of the sample is indicative of
a real trend. Before 2010, the share of crimes committed by someone who
committed a crime in any of the prior years was very low—only 7%. The
next year, the share of recidivist crimes jumps up even as total crime falls. In
sum, these data indicate that there is an increase in recidivism in 2011 that is
explained by neither enforcement nor our definition of recidivism. And that
jump persists for the next six years, even as overall enforcement falls.

194. We find more recidivists because our sample period is larger and also our matching of
subsidiaries to parent firms is potentially more precise. CLAYPOOL, supra note 34, at 42.
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Figure 14: Number of Corporate Prosecutions and Recidivist Prosecutions
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Corporate recidivism appears to be on the rise, even as the number of
enforcement actions declines. And our results indicate two potential causes:
recidivist penalties become more lenient over time, and recidivists receive
more lenient fines than one-time offenders. Our analysis therefore indicates
that the use of fines by federal enforcers may be resulting in sub-optimal
deterrence, especially for the largest companies.
III. Implications
Part II suggested that corporate crime is trending upward, and in this
Part, we discuss two primary implications. First, we explore the aspects of
the DOJ’s enforcement regime that could be contributing to an uptick in
crime. We also offer suggestions about what the DOJ and other policymakers
should do to improve deterrence going forward. Second, and more broadly,
we highlight the inadequacy of the existing data on corporate criminality that
complicates our project and leads to our most forceful recommendation: that
the government should do more to study and provide data about corporate
criminality. We also offer suggestions for future research in this area.
First, our evidence offers crude support for the view that the DOJ’s
enforcement regime that privileges entity liability and fines over individual
liability is not adequately deterring crime by corporate employees. Of course,
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it is possible that rising crime levels would be consistent with an optimal
deterrence regime. The optimal level of crime is likely higher than zero,195
and perhaps there was too much deterrence (and too little crime) in the period
before our sample. But we do not think this is likely for a few reasons. For
one, the 2008 financial crisis precedes our sample, and many commentators
view lax regulatory oversight and policing of fraud and misconduct as
contributing factors to the global economic collapse.196 In other words, it is
unlikely that the government was over-deterring financial institution
misconduct in the period preceding the 2008 financial crisis. Compounding
this view is the evidence that, before 2008, prosecutions of banks were quite
rare. Indeed, from 2001 to 2007, the DOJ only brought thirty-four
enforcement actions against financial institutions—most of which were
settled with small fines.197
Therefore, we believe that our evidence supports the view that the
federal enforcement regime is not optimally deterring misconduct by
financial institutions and other corporations. And this is despite the fact that
the DOJ was, until 2018, securing record-breaking fines. Our results in
subpart III(D) provide a possible explanation as to why these fines may be
failing to deter future incidents of misconduct: it appears that the overall size
of the fine may be limited by political or legal forces, especially for larger
public companies. For one, massive fines ultimately penalize shareholders,
making enforcers wary to come down too hard on them.198 Relatedly,
prosecutors may lack an incentive to push for massive fines; firm
punishments are judged based on their dollar value, and for large enough
firms, prosecutors can chalk up a major win after imposing a fine that is quite
small relative to the company’s revenue and size. In addition, enforcement
agencies may be limited by statutes that cap the amount of fines that can be
levied.
195. Eliminating all corporate crime would be very expensive, and the benefit would likely be
dwarfed by the cost. See Christopher Carrigan & Cary Coglianese, Oversight in Hindsight:
Assessing the U.S. Regulatory System in the Wake of Calamity, in REGULATORY BREAKDOWN: THE
CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE IN U.S. REGULATION 1, 10 (Cary Coglianese ed., 2012) (“[T]he complete
elimination of all harms . . . is not possible without stopping altogether the very activities that give
rise to these harmful events.”).
196. E.g., MARIA KRAMBIA-KAPARDIS, CORPORATE FRAUD AND CORRUPTION: A HOLISTIC
APPROACH TO PREVENTING FINANCIAL CRISES 5–6 (2016); NICHOLAS RYDER, THE FINANCIAL
CRISIS AND WHITE COLLAR CRIME: THE PERFECT STORM? 21 (2014); Henry N. Pontell, William
K. Black & Gilbert Geis, Too Big to Fail, Too Powerful to Jail? On the Absence of Criminal
Prosecutions After the 2008 Financial Meltdown, 61 CRIME L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 3 (2013)
(describing fraud, corruption, and corporate crime as contributing factors to national and global
financial crises).
197. Garrett, Bank Prosecutions, supra note 3, at 48–50 app. A.
198. See Rosenstein, supra note 49 (noting that “[i]t is important to impose penalties on
corporations that engage in misconduct,” but “[c]orporate cases often penalize innocent employees
and shareholders without effectively punishing the human beings responsible for making corrupt
decisions”).
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The consequence, however, is that for the largest firms, even sky-high
penalties are likely viewed as just another cost of doing business—more of a
pinprick than a meaningful deterrent. Perversely, therefore, the U.S.
enforcement regime is treating the largest institutions more leniently than
smaller institutions, despite the fact that large institutions are more likely to
commit crimes that result in widely felt public harm.
In addition, we are skeptical that fines, and even very large ones, are
capable of adequately deterring future incidents of crime by themselves.199
Again, when a large public company bears a fine, the shareholders bear the
brunt of the penalty. In theory, those shareholders should have an incentive
to demand reforms to deter future crimes that will cost them money; in
reality, rationally apathetic shareholders have little capacity to police
malfeasance, especially when crimes may well have been committed years
before punishments are handed down.200 In addition, the ultimate deterrent
effect of fines against large public corporations and their shareholders may
be muted by several factors. In particular, although a company’s stock price
falls after the announcement of an investigation or the filing of charges, it
usually bounces back very quickly, which could further discourage
shareholders from taking action.201 For these reasons, even very large fines
imposed on the entity might not induce the company to deter future incidents
of wrongdoing.202
199. Polinsky and Shavell provide the classic law and economics view that “if firms are made
strictly liable for their harms, they will design rewards and punishments for their employees that
will lead employees to reduce the risk of harm, since firms will want to reduce their liability
payments.” Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 23. We join Jennifer Arlen and Reinier Kraakman in
pushing back on the assumption that firms will necessarily respond in this way. Arlen & Kraakman,
supra note 28, at 692–93 (discussing the flaws with a strict liability regime for corporate liability).
200. See Arlen & Kahan, supra note 38, at 357 n.96 (noting that shareholders are often not in
the most effective position to reform corporate practices); ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE
LAW 390–92 (1986) (discussing rational apathy among shareholders); Bernard S. Black,
Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 536–42 (1990) (discussing proxy rules
and the burdens these rules create for collective shareholder action). Of course, the modern
corporation’s shareholder base is largely comprised of institutional investors with large stakes in
the underlying company. In theory, the presence of large and sophisticated investors could
ameliorate our concerns; however, there is evidence that agency problems may compromise the
efforts of these investors. E.g., Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of
Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 2029, 2075–116
(2019); Dorothy S. Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, 43 J. CORP. L. 493, 506–
23 (2018).
201. Jonathan M. Karpoff, Does Reputation Work to Discipline Corporate Misconduct?, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE REPUTATION 361, 368 (Michael L. Barnett & Timothy G.
Pollock eds., 2012); COFFEE, supra note 27.
202. Note, however, that the dollar amount of the penalty may understate the total amount. For
example, a criminal penalty may cause the company to suffer reputational harm, and consumers
may distrust and shun a corporation that is punished publicly for malfeasance. The extent of these
more amorphous aspects of corporate criminal penalties is disputed. See Cindy R. Alexander &
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In sum, our data support the law and economics scholars who argue
against utilizing fines as the sole penalty for corporate crime: Even as fines
have risen, our data indicate that corporate crime has increased, too.
Therefore, we suggest that prosecutors supplement entity-level fines with
other punishments. Although several options would increase the deterrence
punch of an entity-level punishment—governance reforms,203 corporate
monitors,204 shaming mechanisms,205 etc.—we focus on reforms that would
make it easier for prosecutors to pursue guilty individuals, as well as the
individuals that enabled their crimes. We make this our focus because we
believe (and our data suggest) that imposing penalties at the entity level is
unlikely to deter crime by agents of widely held companies. Although
governance reforms and corporate monitors are intended to target compliance
problems directly, enforcers are limited by a lack of information and
expertise, making it easy for insiders to game the system.206 By contrast,
pursuing guilty individuals ensures that there is no disconnect between the

Jennifer Arlen, Does Conviction Matter? The Reputational and Collateral Effects of Corporate
Crime, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE CRIME AND FINANCIAL MISDEALING 87, 88
(Jennifer Arlen ed., 2018) (discussing the indirect costs of criminal conviction). Ultimately, our
results indicate that the total impact of penalties—monetary and non-monetary alike—are not
sufficiently deterring future criminality.
203. See Arlen & Kahan, supra note 38, at 353 (discussing how governance reforms secured in
pretrial diversion agreements can be used to help address managerial-policing agency costs, which
occur when management benefits from tolerating wrongdoing). Examples of such reforms “include
restricted stock (or bonuses) that would vest (or be paid) only after a specified tenure of ‘clean’
(crime-free) management; provisions for clawing back compensation in the event of corporate
crime; and even abandonment of equity compensation altogether.” Buell, Criminally Bad
Management, supra note 31, at 66.
204. Largely descriptive work exists on the potential importance of corporate monitorships, but
relatively little exists by way of measuring the extent to which monitors deter future criminal
behavior. See generally Veronica Root, Modern-Day Monitorships, 33 YALE J. ON REGUL. 109
(2016) (describing modern-day corporate monitorship); Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 38
(discussing recommendations for the use of corporate monitors). Our data on corporate recidivism
indicate that the presence of a monitor is not deterring future malfeasance.
205. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811, 1831 (2001)
(suggesting shaming sanctions would encourage corporations to self-monitor and punish
corporations that fail to do so); Jayne W. Barnard, Reintegrative Shaming in Corporate Sentencing,
72 S. CAL. L. REV. 959, 970 (1999) (observing that shame can be a substantial deterrent to corporate
crime and is most effective when aimed at the corporate entity); BRENT FISSE & JOHN
BRAITHWAITE, THE IMPACT OF PUBLICITY ON CORPORATE OFFENDERS (1983) (emphasizing
shaming as a means to control corporate crime). But see Khanna, supra note 30, at 1503 (noting that
reputational penalties create social costs).
206. See Holger Spamann, Monetary Liability for Breach of the Duty of Care?, 8 J. LEG.
ANALYSIS 337, 344, 356–57, 360–61 (2016) (suggesting judicial evaluations are subject to
information manipulation and face unique challenges when assessing business decisions).
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recipient of the punishment and the bad actor, increasing the likelihood of
both general and specific deterrence.207
However, the information asymmetries that limit the efficacy of
externally imposed compliance reforms also limit the government’s ability to
detect and punish individual wrongdoing. In the wake of a corporate scandal,
it is often challenging to determine who was responsible for the crime.
Corporate decisionmaking is diffuse, made by many different actors at
different levels, which makes it difficult to hold any individual responsible
beyond a reasonable doubt.208 This problem is especially challenging in
heavily regulated industries, including banking, where legal requirements
often mandate that decisions be made by multiple decisionmakers. In
addition, across all industries, it can be difficult to distinguish beneficial
corporate risk-taking from intentional criminal activity.209 And often, the
only feasible charges involve low-level employees rather than the executives
who create cultures that foster criminality.210 Therefore, demanding
additional individual-level prosecutions alone, without finding a way to
ascribe indirect liability to those at the top, is likely to fall hardest on lowlevel employees who follow orders, rather than top executives who give
them.211 As an illustration of this reality, consider that former Wells Fargo
CEO John Stumpf testified to the Senate in September 2016 that the firm
responded to the fake accounts scandal by firing 5,300 low-level bankers and
tellers.212 His resignation came only a month later and was a response to

207. See Arlen, Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 25, at 170–72 (arguing individual
liability deters individual wrongdoing and enhances the deterrent effect of corporate liability); Kelli
D. Tomlinson, An Examination of Deterrence Theory: Where Do We Stand?, FED. PROB., Dec.
2016, at 33, 33 (“The concept of specific deterrence proposes that individuals who commit crime(s)
and are caught and punished will be deterred from future criminal activity. On the other hand,
general deterrence suggests that the general population will be deterred from offending when they
are aware of others being apprehended and punished.”); Honorable Jed Rakoff, U.S. Dist. Judge, S.
Dist. of N.Y., Address at the NYU School of Law Conference on Corporate Crime and Financial
Misdealing (Apr. 17, 2015), https://youtu.be/fw8Y2hqyOrk?t=1975 [https://perma.cc/PB8F-Y9JM]
(advocating individual prosecutions for corporate crime to promote deterrence and accountability).
208. SAMUEL W. BUELL, CAPITAL OFFENSES: BUSINESS CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICA’S CORPORATE AGE, at xv (2016).
209. Id.
210. Buell, Criminally Bad Management, supra note 31, at 72 (noting that in most cases
“individuals close enough to the execution of the product or transaction to know enough for criminal
liability will not be the senior managers (and certainly not the board members) who bear
responsibility for designing and implementing systems for the prevention of crime”).
211. The reality that low-level employees often take the brunt of criminal investigations is
unfortunate for another reason: it may discourage reporting and complicate corporate compliance
efforts.
212. An Examination of Wells Fargo’s Unauthorized Accounts and the Regulatory Response:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urb. Affs., 114th Cong. 6 (2016) (statement of
John Stumpf, Chairman and Chief Exec. Officer, Wells Fargo & Co.).
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missteps before the Senate during this testimony, rather than accountability
for the scandal directly.213
The sporadic targeting of low-level employees is unlikely to supply
adequate deterrence, as our data suggest. More regular punishment of crime
by low-level employees would obviously make the decision to offend less
appealing, but there are practical reasons why enforcement agencies might
not be inclined to do this. For one, enforcement agencies are resource
constrained and unable to pursue every instance of individual misconduct. In
addition, the decision to increase punishment for low-level offenders to
account for the low probability of detection and punishment is quite
unpalatable, especially given the complex nature of organizational crime. A
mid-level manager who opens a fake account in the face of unrelenting sales
pressure from senior management has committed a crime, but we might think
that her culpability is lessened by the fact that senior management has created
an environment where offending is the most attractive option. We are not
inclined to suggest that prosecutors seek a lengthy prison sentence for that
mid-level manager to account for the low probability of detection (nor would
prosecutors be inclined to follow such a suggestion).
As this example further reveals, low-level offenders tend to commit
crimes in response to organizational pressure,214 and yet there is almost no
way to pin criminal charges on the top executives who are responsible for
that culture. Recall that in the wake of the financial crisis, no senior
management went to jail. Across all industries, senior executives rarely face
criminal penalties in the wake of a crime. And we believe that this reality
contributes to our empirical findings that corporate crime is trending upward.
Indeed, we think a central failing of the federal corporate criminal justice
regime is a lack of a cause of action that is responsive to the complex nature
of organizational crime. Both as a matter of equity and as a matter of
deterrence, it is important to punish high-ranking executives who create
environments that facilitate criminal behavior. These individuals have
substantial control over corporate culture and can incentivize (or
disincentivize) misconduct. Their punishment also has more deterrence value
because individual punishment—be it public shaming, financial clawbacks,
or in the extreme, jail time—is more likely to be noticed when executives,
rather than relative unknowns, are sanctioned.
Some have recognized this problem and proposed a legislative solution.
For example, Senator Warren has introduced a bill that “would authorize
213. Matt Egan, Jackie Wattles & Cristina Alesci, Wells Fargo CEO John Stumpf Is Out, CNN
MONEY (Oct. 12, 2016, 7:31 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2016/10/12/investing/wells-fargo-ceojohn-stumpf-retires/index.html [https://perma.cc/ZC2W-DAGG].
214. See MARK COLVIN, CRIME AND COERCION: AN INTEGRATED THEORY OF CHRONIC
CRIMINALITY 130–32 (2000) (noting the correlation between organizational pressure and various
types of crime).
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prosecution of an executive officer of any corporation that generates more
than $1 billion in annual revenue for ‘negligently permit[ting] or fail[ing] to
prevent’ either a criminal or civil violation by the company” that affects “the
health, safety, finances, or personal data” of one percent or more of the
population.215 Put simply, Senator Warren has proposed to enable prosecutors
to hold negligent corporate executives criminally responsible for corporate
crimes that affect a large number of people.216
This is a controversial proposal. A bedrock of the U.S. criminal justice
system is that an individual who acts without mens rea is not liable under
criminal law—indeed, criminal justice reformers have focused on increasing
the burden on prosecutors to prove a defendant’s guilty mental state.217 The
Warren proposal would replace the requisite criminal intent with a much
lower standard, requiring only that a corporate executive be negligent. 218
Doing so could entice federal prosecutors to pursue top executives by easing
the prospect of a victory. But expanding criminal liability to include negligent
conduct is contrary to our legal tradition and strikes many as unfair and
unjust.219
An alternative would be to model future legal reform after existing
causes of action that place legal responsibility on individuals who facilitate
crimes by others. One possibility would be to look at control person liability,

215. Robert Anello, Employee Liability for Corporate Misconduct—Elizabeth Warren Style:
Can Negligence Become Criminal?, FORBES (Sept. 18, 2019, 6:01 PM), https://www.forbes.com
/sites/insider/2019/09/18/employee-liability-for-corporate-misconduct-elizabeth-warren-style-cannegligence-become-criminal/#3a1605da67f1 [https://perma.cc/3WQM-VCE8]. Note that under the
existing Responsible Corporate Office Doctrine, criminal liability can be expanded to “executives
whose subordinates engage in criminal activity, even if the executives are not aware of it, so long
as the executives can be deemed responsible for the actors who commit the crime.” Lev L. Dassin,
Jennifer Kennedy Park & David E. Wagner, Bill Proposal—Corporate Executives Criminally
Accountable for Negligent Conduct, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Apr. 18, 2019),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/04/18/bill-proposal-corporate-executives-criminallyaccountable-for-negligent-conduct/ [https://perma.cc/4DLD-DC26]. However, this doctrine is
“applied narrowly in the context of offenses against the public health and welfare.” Id.
216. Anello, supra note 215. Senator Warren also proposed the “Ending Too Big to Jail Act,”
which would have focused enforcement resources on financial institutions in three main ways (the
bill was proposed in March 2018 and died in committee). S. 2544, 115th Cong. (2018). First, the
bill would have created a permanent law enforcement agency within the Treasury Department
charged with investigating financial institution fraud. Second, the bill would have required certain
financial institution executives to certify that the institution had not committed criminal conduct or
civil fraud. And third, the bill would have required courts to make a determination that DPAs are in
the public interest before allowing them to go forward. Id.
217. Benjamin Levin, Mens Rea Reform and Its Discontents, 109 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
491, 510–12, 524–25 (2019); Timothy Lynch, Polluting Our Principles: Environmental
Prosecutions and the Bill of Rights, in GO DIRECTLY TO JAIL: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF ALMOST
EVERYTHING 45, 65 (Gene Healy ed., 2004).
218. Dassin, supra note 215.
219. Lynch, supra note 217, at 65 (calling the mens rea requirement “completely inconsistent
with the Anglo-American tradition”).
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which is established under Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act.220
That provision imposes liability on those who control individuals who violate
securities laws, unless the control person can establish that they acted in good
faith and did not induce the violation.221 Courts have found that the
affirmative defense is met when the control person has put in place “a
reasonable and proper system of supervision and internal control.”222 Put
simply, executives and directors who facilitate securities fraud by others can
be pursued so long as they control the wrongdoer and fail to meet the
affirmative defense. A similar cause of action could be used to give the DOJ
power to pursue executives and directors who control individuals who
commit a broad swath of crimes. Doing so would provide incentives for
executives and directors to serve as gatekeepers and root out crime by
subordinates, rather than encourage criminality or tolerate corporate cultures
that allow crime to flourish.
Another possibility would be to model reform on 18 U.S.C. § 2(a),
which makes it a crime to aid or abet the commission of a crime.223 This
provision is more regularly used by the SEC than Section 20(a) to pursue
secondary liability for individuals who facilitate securities fraud;224 it is also
used by prosecutors seeking charges for individuals who could not be held
directly liable for crimes that are committed by others. For the latter, the
prosecutor must establish that the aider and abetter (1) committed “an
affirmative act in furtherance” of the crime and (2) had the “intent of
facilitating the offense’s commission.”225 In other words, the prosecutor need
not show that the individual committed the crime, which removes a
substantial hurdle. Instead, the prosecution must prove that the executive
acted to further the crime with the intent of facilitating it—a challenging task.
Therefore, legislators could modify the elements of the crime to encompass
executives who knowingly facilitate crimes by subordinates—by their action
or inaction. Specifically, when arguing that a senior executive aided and
abetted crime by subordinates, the prosecution could be required to establish
that the senior executive (1) committed an affirmative act or omission in
furtherance of the crime and (2) did so with the knowledge that crime was
taking place.
Consider how this cause of action could be used in the hypothetical
prosecution against John Stumpf for the fake account scandal at Wells Fargo.
From 2011 to 2015, Wells Fargo created as many as two million unauthorized
220. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a).
221. Id.
222. Marbury Mgmt., Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 716 (2d Cir. 1980).
223. 18 U.S.C. § 2(a).
224. Marc I. Steinberg & Forrest C. Roberts, Laxity at the Gates: The SEC’s Neglect to Enforce
Control Person Liability, 11 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 201, 237 (2017).
225. Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65, 71 (2014).
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accounts.226 It is illegal to open a fake account for a customer, and yet no
individuals were charged criminally—presumably because the DOJ could
only successfully pursue low-level employees, many of whom had already
been fired.227 Stumpf likely knew about the illegal sales practices for some
time: complaints about illegal and unethical sales activity throughout the
bank were submitted directly to his office, and he was “frequently informed”
by bank employees about sales practice issues.228 Although the bank
terminated employees who were caught opening accounts, one of the
complaints submitted to Stumpf’s office alleged that the extent of the
misconduct was much more widespread than Stumpf realized and that it
involved many more consumer-facing bankers than had been caught and
punished.229 And yet, the bank did not investigate or respond. Stumpf’s
compensation tells us something about his motivation: In 2015 alone, several
million dollars of his bonus were attributable to “growing ‘primary
consumer, small business and banking checking customers.’”230
Of course, it would be impossible to charge Stumpf for the illegal act of
creating the accounts. But what about an aiding and abetting claim, as we
envision it? Prosecutors could argue that Stumpf’s failure to act to root out
the widespread misconduct consisted of a knowing omission that furthered
the commission of crime. In addition, there is evidence that Stumpf protected
wrongdoers and even endorsed the illegal activity.231 After customers and
city attorneys began suing Wells Fargo over its practice of opening fake
accounts, Stumpf emailed the following to another executive: “We do such a
good job in this area. I will fight this one to the finish. Do you know only
around 1% of our people lose their jobs [for] gaming the system . . . . Did
some do things wrong—you bet and that is called life.”232 These facts would
also likely suffice for liability under an expanded control person liability
226. Egan, supra note 99.
227. Stumpf and five other senior executives ultimately paid civil fines in an action brought by
the OCC, and Stumpf has been banned from working in banking. Nathan Bomey, Ex-Wells Fargo
CEO Banned from Banking, Must Pay $17.5M Fine for Role in Fake-Accounts Scandal, USA
TODAY (Jan. 23, 2020, 2:48 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2020/01/23/wells-fargoex-ceo-john-stumpf-banned-banking-fined-17-5-m/4554673002/ [https://perma.cc/GWR2-PS8A].
228. Consent Order at 3–4, In re John Stumpf, No. AA-EC-2019-83 (Jan. 22, 2020), https://
www.occ.gov/static/enforcement-actions/ea2020-004.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LRS8-NBBN];
Bethany McLean, How Wells Fargo’s Cutthroat Corporate Culture Allegedly Drove Bankers to
Fraud, VANITY FAIR (May 31, 2017), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/05/wells-fargocorporate-culture-fraud [https://perma.cc/ZPZ3-QLYV].
229. See McLean, supra note 228 (“In 2011, a group of bankers who were terminated for sales
violations wrote a letter to Stumpf, arguing that their actions had not only been condoned by
management in their branch, but that similar things were happening across the bank.”).
230. Matt Egan, Wells Fargo CEO Walks with $130 Million, CNN MONEY (Oct. 13, 2016,
1:23 PM),
https://money.cnn.com/2016/10/13/investing/wells-fargo-ceo-resigns-compensation
/index.html [https://perma.cc/TJ79-PMEV].
231. McLean, supra note 228.
232. Id.
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standard; Stumpf surely had control over the wrongdoers, and his failure to
implement a reasonable system of supervision would deprive him of an
affirmative defense.
In sum, modeling a cause of action off of either aiding and abetting or
control person liability would be a plausible path forward for legislators who
recognize that organizational crime is complex and that culpability may
ultimately lie with the top executives who incentivized and supported the
commission of the crime. And employing these causes of action would do
much to improve deterrence: top executives who fear that they could be held
responsible for crimes would do more to prevent them from occurring in the
first place. At the same time, concerns about overdeterrence also exist: for
both control person liability and aiding and abetting liability, the person
found secondarily liable is “punishable as a principal.”233 And the prospect
of steep penalties and jail time could have adverse consequences, especially
if the cause of action penalizes an executive’s failure to notice and address
criminality by subordinates. Because executives only receive a portion of the
upside from underlying misconduct, but could conceivably bear substantial
downside, individual punishment for such conduct may encourage executives
to be overly cautious and discourage beneficial risk-taking.234 In addition,
qualified executives might even refuse to work for large or floundering
companies to avoid the risk of penalties.235 Or they might do more to cover
their tracks.236
This risk is one of the reasons why we prefer a modified aiding and
abetting rule to Senator Warren’s proposed legislation: the imposition of a

233. 18 U.S.C. § 2(a).
234. Spamann, supra note 206, at 350 n.16. In the corporate principal–agent relationship, agents
are financially motivated. This means that liability for the breach of duty of care could discourage
efficient risk-taking because agents receive only some of the benefits, but substantial costs, of
subordinates’ risks. Id.
235. See id. at 339 (arguing that exposing managers or directors to full liability for losses
resulting from sub-optimal actions might lead them to refuse the positions or to demand very high
risk premiums); 2015 Mid-Year Update on Corporate Non-Prosecution Agreements (NPAs) and
Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs), GIBSON DUNN (July 8, 2015), https://
www.gibsondunn.com/2015-mid-year-update-on-corporate-non-prosecution-agreements-npasand-deferred-prosecution-agreements-dpas/ [https://perma.cc/Q7GB-632E] (“Overly harsh
penalties against the corporate entity will merely incentivize its best professionals to jump ship,
while innocent shareholders and local communities are left holding the bag as the company is
destroyed or permanently crippled.”).
236. This point has been made with respect to criminal prosecutions against Boeing and its
executives for failure to address deficiencies in the 737 Max that led to deadly plane crashes. See,
e.g., Will Boeing Face Criminal Charges for 737 Max Crashes?, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS. (Mar. 20, 2019,
12:31 PM), https://www.chicagobusiness.com/manufacturing/will-boeing-face-criminal-charges737-max-crashes [https://perma.cc/U2PC-CWZR] (“[The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)]
want[s] to encourage people to come forward and admit mistakes, free from fear of reprisal or
jail . . . . The last thing the industry and FAA needs is the specter of a criminal investigation
hovering over an accident inquiry.” (quoting Kenneth Quinn, former Chief Counsel of the FAA)).
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negligence standard almost certainly would lead to these perverse
consequences.237 Another way to allay these concerns would be to limit the
penalties associated with secondary liability. A potential model comes from
the certification requirement mandated by Section 302 of the Sarbanes–
Oxley Act of 2002.238 Under the SEC’s adopting rules, top executive and
financial officers at public companies must certify that the companies’ annual
and quarterly reports are accurate and complete.239 Certifying false reports
can lead to civil penalties, and willfully false certifications could result in
criminal prosecution.240 This rule helpfully induces executives to play a
greater role in oversight of financial statements and also eases the prospect
of charges against executives who participated in financial statement
manipulation or failed to monitor those who did. In addition, the statute caps
the criminal penalty: the maximum penalty for willful certification is
$5 million and/or twenty years in prison.241 To avoid the prospect of
overdeterrence, legislators could likewise cap the penalty for any new cause
of action aimed at penalizing executives who facilitate criminality by
subordinates.
The Sarbanes–Oxley certification requirement was borne out of a
recognition that more should be done to encourage corporate management to
serve as gatekeepers for corporate misconduct. Likewise, the Delaware
Supreme Court has been increasingly receptive to Caremark claims, which
allow shareholders to challenge monitoring deficiencies at the board level by
suing individual directors.242 In the decision that initially embraced this
claim, the Court of Chancery recognized that it would encourage boards of
directors to proactively adopt adequate compliance systems and stay abreast
of their workings.243 And in the past several years, several Caremark claims
have survived motions to dismiss, indicating a growing judicial receptiveness

237. Spamann, supra note 206, at 350 n.16.
238. 15 U.S.C. § 7241.
239. Id.
240. 18 U.S.C. § 1350.
241. Id.
242. See James E. Langston, Mark E. McDonald & Philippa Ratzki, Not So Sweet: Delaware
Supreme Court Revives Caremark Claim, Provides Guidance on Directors’ Oversight Duties,
CLEARY GOTTLIEB (June 24, 2019), https://www.clearymawatch.com/2019/06/not-so-sweetdelaware-supreme-court-revives-caremark-claim-provides-guidance-on-directors-oversight-duties/
[https://perma.cc/8DKF-D6W6] (“However, the case is a reminder that Caremark claims are not
impossible to establish and in the event of particularly egregious facts can be used to hold directors
accountable.”); Cydney Posner, Another Caremark Case Survives a Challenge, COOLEY PUBCO
(Sept. 15, 2021), https://cooleypubco.com/2021/09/15/caremark-case-survives-challenge/ [https://
perma.cc/M7VA-WL98] (noting that several Caremark cases have survived dismissal in the past
few years).
243. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 972 (Del. Ch. 1996).
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to individual liability for compliance failures and underscoring the
importance of board engagement in compliance issues.244
We believe that further moves in this direction, such as the use of an
aiding and abetting claim to pursue high-level executives, would do more to
deter corporate crime than any entity-level punishment. And our data
suggests that such additional deterrence is warranted. However, we recognize
that our data allow us to make only limited normative recommendations. And
this brings us to our second implication: policymakers and researchers need
better data. Therefore, we urge the government to do what it does for all other
types of crime and measure corporate crime levels. The asymmetry between
public-order crime and corporate crime statistics is deeply problematic. Most
basically, the lack of data hampers corporate criminal enforcement. The
principal goal of corporate criminal liability is deterrence, but without an
understanding of whether criminality is rising or falling, we cannot know
whether this goal is being achieved. And identifying the right enforcement
framework is critically important. Measures of white-collar crime in the
United States estimate that it costs anywhere from $426 billion to $1.7 trillion
annually.245 Put simply, corporate crime affects all of us—as consumers,
employees, and investors who increasingly save for retirement by investing
in the stock market. Critics of corporate criminal liability have focused too
much on the harm to shareholders when corporations are forced to pay fines
and too little on the harm to the entire economy when corporate crime is not
effectively deterred.246 Better data would enable a better understanding of the
aspects of the federal enforcement regime that are succeeding or failing and
where additional attention and resources should be directed. It would also
facilitate efforts by those who are critical of corporate criminal enforcement
to effectively advocate for policy changes, like those we discuss earlier in
this Part.
Beyond their import for evaluating our enforcement regime, adequate
data on corporate crime could also help attenuate inequalities in our criminal
justice system. Blue-collar offenders generally serve jail sentences for publicorder crimes; by contrast, white-collar criminals are rarely prosecuted and,
when they are, generally bear less severe consequences.247 Much has been
244. See, e.g., In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litig., C.A. No. 2017-0222, 2019 WL
4850188 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2019) (denying the motion to dismiss); Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d
805, 808 (Del. 2019) (same); In re Boeing Co. Derivative Litig., C.A. No. 2019-0907, 2021 WL
4059934 (Del. Ch. Sept. 7, 2021) (denying the motion to dismiss the Caremark claims against the
director defendants with one exception).
245. JAMES C. HELMKAMP, KITTY J. TOWNSEND & JENNY A. SUNDRA, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
NAT’L WHITE COLLAR CRIME CTR., NCJ 167026, HOW MUCH DOES WHITE COLLAR CRIME COST?
11 (2001), https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Photocopy/167026NCJRS.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ANZ8TAV].
246. See supra note 3.
247. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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written about the reasons for this inequity, and we offer an additional
explanation: Crime statistics play an important role in fueling policing
efforts. Not only that, the lack of statistics for corporate crime insulates
enforcement agencies that take a lenient approach to corporate punishment.
Without any information about whether crime is increasing, agencies can
hide behind statements that their enforcement policies are adequately, or even
optimally, deterring crime.
Although data estimating corporate crime rates would be difficult to
collect, it is not impossible. Data on non-white-collar crime provide a hint of
where to begin. As discussed, both the BJS and the FBI make annual crime
reports available each year.248 These data are aggregated from surveys of
police officers and households. We think a similar approach could be taken
with regard to corporate crime, and perhaps white-collar crime, as a starting
point. Instead of surveying police officers, the government could work with
prosecutors and other enforcement agencies to document incidents of
corporate crime that prosecutors suspect had occurred but chose not to
pursue. Data on leniency programs, such as the program run by the Antitrust
Division of the DOJ, which allows corporations and individuals who selfreport bad behavior to avoid criminal conviction, would also provide useful
information.249 But as discussed, data provided by enforcement agencies are
subject to endogeneity concerns. Therefore, a useful complement to this
effort would be to survey compliance officials within institutions who could
speak about the rates of underlying crime that were detected, under the
condition that they would receive full anonymity and that their statements
could not be used against them in an enforcement action.
In addition, the government could improve the data that already exist,
aiding in research like our own. For example, the government could offer
more detail about the claims reported by corporate whistleblowers and the
information contained in SARs. Although anonymity for individuals and
firms contributes to the willingness to self-report, the choice of anonymity
over data access has significant consequences for our understanding of the
landscape of corporate crime. The tradeoffs should be weighed carefully.
We also offer suggestions for academics studying this question with the
limited data that exist. For one, exogenous shocks to corporate crime regimes
provide an opportunity to study how legal regime change alters corporate
behavior. Several studies have relied on shocks to study corporate
compliance (e.g., following Arthur Andersen’s demise, which forced

248. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
249. Leniency Program, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/atr/leniency-program
[https://perma.cc/GPW7-BPNJ] (Feb. 20, 2020).
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corporations to change auditors250) and insider trading.251 Future work could
follow a similar approach to study changes in criminal enforcement. Making
use of exogenous shifts in legal environment and tracing out their impact on
reported crime will not paint a full picture of corporate crime levels, but doing
so can help provide micro-level evidence on the pervasiveness of corporate
crime, as well as the consequences for corporate institutions of our under (or
over) deterring it.
Beyond exploiting exogenous shifts to trace out causal relationships
between legal institutions and crime levels, researchers can be creative about
aggregating data from a variety of sources to draw inferences about corporate
criminal behavior. In this Article, we have reported data from complaints by
corporate customers, self-reporting on malfeasance by firm employees, and
data studying corporate prosecutions. And this is just the tip of the iceberg.
There is much more that could be done, for example, by working with
individual firms to acquire proprietary data about internal employee
malfeasance. Generating additional survey data could also be useful,
provided that the methodological issues discussed in Part II(B) are addressed.
Ultimately, our hope is to encourage others to engage with the messiness of
the data that exist—and to push for new data sources made available by
private and public actors—so that we can better estimate the level of criminal
behavior by corporate actors and how it responds to evolving legal regimes.
Conclusion
This Article takes important steps toward determining whether
corporate crime is on the rise. Our analysis of three distinct and novel data
sources indicates that aggregate levels of certain types of corporate
misconduct have risen in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008. And our
study of corporate criminal recidivism suggests a cause: an over-reliance on
fines as a penalty. Our principal normative recommendation is for the
government to supply, and researchers to analyze, better data on this subject.
If our results are confirmed after further study, however, the answer is clear:
An enforcement regime that is limited in its ability to levy fines at an optimal
level must rely on other forms of punishment—such as the imposition of
liability on guilty individuals and the top executives who facilitate their
crimes—to increase deterrence. Only then will corporate criminal
punishment be seen as more than a cost of doing business.

250. Dyck, supra note 113, at 2233.
251. Diane Del Guercio, Elizabeth R. Odders-White & Mark J. Ready, The Deterrent Effect of
the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Enforcement Intensity on Illegal Insider Trading:
Evidence from Run-up Before News Events, 60 J.L. & ECON. 269, 269–73 (2017).

